

THE ADAPTATION AND COOPERATION OF MINORITY MUSLIMS IN RUSSIAN HISTORY

Fachrizaral A. Halim

Harvard Law School, Harvard University, United States of America

Abstract

The present essay examines the common approach in reading the relationship between Muslims and Russian society as if they were bound by perpetual conflict. Following this angle, historians argue that the Russians underwent long term conflict with Muslims and claim that the Russians have suffered more than any other people in facing the hostile world of Islam. Some also argue that Muslims were completely subdued by the Russians due to Islam's incompatibility with the secular and atheist Soviet regime. A careful survey of literature on the history of Muslims in Russia, however, does not always lead to the conclusion that the two sides were in continuous conflict. In fact, aside from conflict and subjugation, both Russians and the Muslims enjoyed a considerable level of peace and shared a similar attitude of flexibility in mutual cooperation. Given the extent of flexibility of Muslims in their encounter with the Russians throughout the Czar and the Soviet regimes, I argue that contemporary scholars have scaled down the dynamic of both Russian and Muslims intellectual articulations in relation to modern politics as well as to the internal relationship between the two sides, and that the relationship between them can be written as other than perpetual conflict.

[Artikel ini mengulas hubungan Islam dan Rusia yang kerap dijelaskan dalam konteks relasi saling bertentangan. Dari cara pandang demikian, ahli sejarah kerap berpendapat bahwa konflik antara keduanya sudah terjadi lama dan orang Rusia adalah korban paling parah yang diakibatkan kebrutalan Islam. Sementara itu, ahli sejarah lainnya berpendapat bahwa orang Islam

sepenuhnya terjajah oleh kekuasaan Rusia karena Islam tidak cocok dengan sistem sekuler dan ateis Soviet. Jika dibaca literatur mengenai sejarah Islam di Rusia, maka relasi konfliktual antara keduanya tidak sepenuhnya benar. Faktanya, terlepas dari konflik dan penaklukan, baik orang Rusia dan umat Islam dapat hidup secara damai dan fleksibel dalam kehidupan sosial mereka. Dengan menjelaskan fleksibilitas relasi antara Muslim dan Rusia pada masa kerajaan Rusia dan rejim Soviet, penulis berargumen bahwa kebanyakan ilmuwan kontemporer menyederhanakan relasi Islam dan Rusia dalam konteks politik modern serta relasi internal antara keduanya, karenanya relasi Islam dan Rusia perlu dijelaskan secara seimbang bahwa relasi konflik antara Islam dan Rusia tidak sepenuhnya benar.]

Keywords: Russian Muslim, minority, religious conflict

DOI: 10.14421/ajis.2013.512.311-335

A. Introduction

One major emplotment in the historical writing of Islam in Russian history is ‘tragedy,’ that is, one that sees conflict as the dominant pattern that shaped the relationship between Muslims and the Russians.¹ Contemporary historians are inclined to take this view for granted and assumed that the relation between Muslims and Russians is bound by permanent conflict, similar to that of Muslims and Christendom in the Byzantine Empire, or in Spain and Southern Europe. Following this angle, the Russians are often praised for their great endeavors to overcome the barbaric Muslims, who for centuries have threatened the rest of Europe. A closer look at the present studies indicates that this particular point of view has become a typical pattern in nearly all Russian and Soviet historical works.² Russian historians, in this case tend to argue that the

¹ ‘Emplotment’ is one of the technical terms used by Hayden White in his categorization of historical explanation, besides ‘argument’, and ‘ideological implication’. White further divides emplotment into four types; romance, satire, comedy, and tragedy. For a discussion of White’s typology of historical explanations, see Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1973), 5-7.

² See for example, Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 5.

Russians underwent long term conflict with the Muslims and claim that they have suffered more than any other people in facing the hostile world of Islam. This exclusive experience gives the Russians the privilege to write the history Muslims and Islam in Russia as a history of conflict and that the Russians eventually subdued the Muslims.

Likewise, many of contemporary non-Russian historians hold similar point of view, that ‘the old prejudices and harmful customs’ – a Gorbachev’s favorite label for Islam-- and the Russians were in continuous conflict. In one of his articles about Islam during the Soviet regime, for example, Yaacov Ro’i states in the opening paragraphs that “Islam, like other religions, fell victim to the militant atheism....the Soviet regime had no alternative but to suppress all its manifestations and institutions.”³ In the same vein, Vernon Schubel, who studied Muslims in Uzbekistan’s context, states that “no other aspect of Uzbekistan’s past was so maligned under the Soviet system as Islam..., Islam and Islamic institutions – including Sufism – were constantly blamed for the backwardness of the Uzbeks, which, in turn, justified their colonization by the Russians and Soviets.”⁴ Muslims, as Ro’i and Schubel observe, were completely subdued by the Russians because of its incompatibility with the secular and atheist Soviet regime.

A careful survey of literature on the history of Muslims in Russia, however, does not always lead us to the conclusion that the two sides were in continuous conflict. It is true that in the long interaction between Russians and Muslims, wars, genocides, persecutions, and anti-religious propaganda were inseparable from the reality of the both sides. However, as I shall show in this article, the relationship between the Russians and the Muslims is also demonstrated by pragmatic cooperation on the both sides. That is to say, aside from conflict and subjugation, both the Russians and the Muslims enjoyed a considerable level of peace and shared a similar attitude of flexibility in mutual cooperation.

From the Muslims side, they did not always consider themselves

³ Yaacov Ro’i, “The Secularization of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas,” in Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 5.

⁴ Vernon Schubel, “Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of the Naqshbandi Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan,” paper presented at the Conference of Naqshbandis in Western and central Asia: Change and continuity, Swedish Reserach Institute Istanbul June 9-11, 1997, p. 75.

as being defeated and subjugated by the Russians. In fact, in certain periods, Muslims were ready to adopt Russian political ideology and placed their hope in the rulers, as was the case during the Czarist and the Communist regimes. Although there were massive anti-Islamic and anti-religious campaigns during the reigns of the Czar and the Soviet regimes, Muslims in Russia were not completely subjugated. On the contrary, it was during these periods of hostility that Muslims creatively adapted their belief to meet the challenge of the new realities they faced. This degree of adaptation may be unprecedented in the overall Islamic history. One must remember that in the normative sense, Islam does not separate the realm of religion from the realm of politics. However, Islam also does not formulate a definite pattern of political theory. It is left to Muslims to decide what constitutes the ideal pattern of a political system. In this sense, they may follow a specific interpretation of traditional Islamic political tradition, which leads to the establishment of Islamic state, or develop a new legal interpretation (*ijtihād*) to cooperate with existing regimes. In the long history of Muslims in Russia, Muslim leaders often made the pragmatic decision to cooperate with the regime, regardless whether the regime was Muslim or infidel (*kāfir*).

Given the extent of flexibility of Muslims in their encounter with the Russians throughout the Czar and the Soviet regimes, I intend to offer a different emplotment other than ‘tragedy’ or emphasizing on conflict on both sides in writing about Islam and Muslims in Russian history. The latter will not only lead us to a narrow conclusion about the relationship between Islam and Russia, but also unjustifiably scale down the dynamic of both Russian and Muslims intellectual articulations in relation to modern politics as well as to the internal relationship between the two sides.

In the following paragraphs, I shall contour the history of Muslims in Russia from the period of the early nineteenth century to the dawn of the Soviet regime and analyze not only conflict and its ideological implication, but also adaptation and cooperation of Muslims within different Russian political systems. The goal is modest; by doing so, I intend to offer an alternative way of reading the relationship between Muslims and Russians.

B. Frame and Historical Background

The first formal encounter between Russia and Islam is known to have started since the eighth century following the Arab–Khazar war. At the time of the war, Russia did not exist as the nation known today. The Russians at the time, or the proto-Russians to be more precise, constituted several eastern Slavic tribes such as Kiev, Chernigov, Pereslavl', Polotsk, Rostov, Liubech, Novgorod, Izborsk, and Kasogi, whose daily life mostly depended on agriculture. It took several centuries for the proto-Russians to seek political consolidation and establish themselves as 'Rus'. One modern historian, Galina M. Yemelianova, suggests that it was the dynamic relationship between the Khazar, Biarmia and Varangian, mostly drawn by long term conflict, that gave the consciousness for 'Rus' to emerge. Quoting Arab sources, Yemelianova also informs us that during the Arab-Khazar war, some proto-Russian tribes, who were under domination of the Khazars, supported the Khazars and helped them to build their defenses in the Northern Caucasus. This support continued when the Khazars devastated the Arabs at Talas in 751 C.E. and expanded their rule over the Southern part of the North Caucasus. Furthermore, the Khazars domination over the proto Russians remained continuous until the invasion of the Scandinavian Varangian tribe who sought economic control in the south, which in turn was central to the emergence of Rus' consciousness. One of the most noticeable events following the conquest of the Varangian was the establishment of Kiev as the new political capital of the Kievan Rus. Accordingly, although the Varangian were foreign to the region, they absorbed the basic indigenous economic and socio-political traditions, as well as the local rituals and etiquette. Hence, what we know today as Rus is basically an amalgamation of the proto-Russian tribes which fell under the tutelage of the many political rulers such as the Khazars and the Varangians.⁵

Further encounters between the Kievan Rus and Islam, however,

⁵ For further discussion of the role of the Khazar, Biarmia, and Varangian in the formation of Russians, see Galina M. Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 1-7. Note that that the name 'Rus' is still problematic in its etymological terminology. Some Russian historians argue that the name was a self-name of the Varangian military and civil aristocracy; others argue that the name derived from one of the Eastern Slavic tribes who lived along the bank of river 'Rus.' See Notes 10, *Ibid.*, p. 205.

did not lead to the same idea of amalgamation as had occurred between the Khazars and Varangians. When the shah of Khwarazm was preparing to build a faith-based relationship with the Kievan princes in the tenth century, for example, Vladimir of Kiev solemnly rejected the Muslim missionaries and insisted that “the Rus love to drink, we cannot be without this” [Islamic Law forbids drinking alcohol].⁶ The same Vladimir of Kiev was also known to have said that undergoing circumcision and neither eating pork nor drinking wine were unpleasant to him.⁷ This leads some historians to believe that the idea of amalgamation was only significant during the formative period of Russian identity and that the relationship between Russia and Islam after the tenth century to the nineteenth century onward was colored by tensions to the extent that being a Russian and a Muslim are incompatible.

However, to assume that religion was the sole primary issue between Russians and the surrounding Muslims is erroneous. As the matter of fact, both Muslims and Russian rulers at the time never sent armies for the sake of religious domination. It is true that when the Russians adopted Orthodox Christianity, their political attitude toward the neighboring Muslims changed dramatically. One may note that after the fall of Constantinople, the center of the Eastern Church, in 1453 to the Ottomans, the court clergy as well as the princes of Moscow began to proclaim that the Russian people and its rulers were the sole divinely ordained guardians of Christianity and Moscow was the only centre of Christianity.⁸ Similarly, from the Muslim side, Russia was seen as the enemy of the faith and therefore it was necessary to build a defense against them. A letter of Abdullah Khan of Bukhara in 1572 to his protégé Kuchum Khan of Siberia captures Muslims’ fear of Russian domination in Siberia:

⁶ Cited in Andreas Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire,” in Edward Allworth (ed.) *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 141.

⁷ See, Edward Allworth, “Encounter,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, a Historical Overview* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 2.

⁸ Hans Bräker, “Soviet Policy toward Islam,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 163.

The enemies of our faith at the present time are the *kāfir* [Russians] ...you must conclude peace [with local Asian chieftains] and think about taking your lands out of the *kāfir*'s hand again. If you carry on the present practices without coming to an understanding...you will remain powerless before the *kāfirs*.⁹

This letter basically shares the same negative opinion about Russians as the latter had about Muslims. However, further information on the same Muslim khanates does not reflect enmity for all Russians. It was true that Russians eventually captured Siberia and forced the Muslims in the region to be their vassals, but one cannot deny that the relationship between Muslims in Bukhara and the Russian empire remained peaceful for centuries.

One may look at a particular event that reflects certain degree peaceful relationship between Muslims and Russians. When the Golden Horde became weak around the fifteen century due to civil wars among the khanates, the Russian princesses, who were relatively stronger than the rest of the khanates, began to take the lands of the Golden Horde and unify them as Russian vassals. This process was possible not only because the Russians were militarily superior, but also because the khanates were voluntarily willing to join the Russian leadership. Such was the case when the Khanate of Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia, and the Crimea as well as from the Nogai Hordes joined the Russian princes. The Russian princes indeed welcomed them, and in return for their voluntarily service in Russian cavalry, the warriors of these khanates were given properties. The Moscow princes also gave the elites of the khanates honorable positions and respected them as members of the nobility of Moscow. The barrier of faith, of course, remained between them. However, the difference in faith did not prevent the Russians and the Muslim khanates from building both military and political alliance.¹⁰

One may note that in the middle of the sixteenth century, the Tatars, who were under control of Russian princes, initiated a series of revolts. The Russians in return responded with force and harsh policies. Many Muslims were slain, others were forcibly baptized or otherwise exiled to other places. However, the Russians under Ivan the Terrible

⁹ Cited in Allworth, "Encounter," p. 3.

¹⁰ Kappeler, "Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire," p. 142.

were not interested in sustaining conflict with Muslims. Ivan believed that his flexible policy toward the Muslims would secure his reign and that maximizing economic resources was better than repression. Ivan was more interested in building cooperation with the loyal Muslim upper class, than dealing with the insurgents. Ivan guaranteed the land of the Muslims and gave them privileges to function in the local administration and, also, integrated them into the upper stratum of his regime. During this period, tens of thousands of Russian peasants became laborers and lived as dependants on Muslims lands with the approval of Ivan. The fact that the Orthodox peasants worked for Muslim landowners may have been unthinkable elsewhere in Europe during the same period.¹¹

This pragmatic policy might be considered too liberal as it gives a degree of tolerance to Muslims. However, there were cases in which the Orthodox religious officials plead for an active policy of missionary activity among the Muslims. Some representatives of the Orthodox officials, with their considerable political influence, were known to have insisted that there must be an aggressive policy to use force and compel Muslims to be baptized, including the destruction of mosques. The Russian authorities, however, remained aloof of the Orthodox official demands and continued to guarantee Muslims freedom from forced conversion. In the instructions of the czar to the newly appointed archbishop Guriï in 1555, the missionaries were warned to avoid coercive activity as formulated in the following statements: "He shall baptize those Tatars who seek baptism voluntarily, but without the use of force." Eight years later, the Moscow authorities reemphasized their message that, "There are people who say, 'Belief is the enemy of (other) beliefs. Therefore Christian rulers annihilate the Muslim.' But it is written for us in the Christian scriptures that it is never permissible to convert anyone to our faith by force. For whoever will hold a belief, he should believe in that belief. God will judge in the Hereafter who has the true belief and who has the false. Human beings have no say on this. Among us, in our land, many people of the Muslim religion serve us, and they live

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44. Bennigsen and Broxup, however, downplayed this kind of pragmatic relationship as for personal reasons rather than for ideological reasons. See Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 77.

according to their belief.”¹²

In the seventeenth century, one may also find that Russian policy toward Muslims changed dramatically and was marked by a direct offensive against Muslim elites and Islamic values. Countless Muslim nobility were forced to be baptized or relinquish their lands to Orthodox peasants. In the same period, numerous mosques were also destroyed and Muslims became subject to the same poll tax as the peasants. However, as Kappeler has put it, forced conversion or Christianization in this period was only a camouflage for the ideology behind it: that is to achieve the new goals of westernization and lift Russia to the higher level of a regularized and unified state.¹³ The idea of systematizing society and to have a unified political system and law was also becoming the official policy of the British in India as well as the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago.¹⁴ In all these cases, the primary issue was the modernization of society, not religion. Religion became an official concern only if it was considered an obstacle to Moscow’s goal to become equal with the Western nations.

It was natural that in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, pragmatic policies toward Muslims were revived because this policy had proven more beneficial in terms of economic and political stability than conflict. Thus in the eighteenth century, Catherine II proclaimed tolerance toward the Muslims and created a Spiritual council responsible for Islam, which offered broad opportunities for religious development. It was the same Catherine who allowed Muslims to print religious books including the Quran after the enactment of liberal legislation. By 1802, some 14,300 copies of religious books were printed with the consent of the government. The publication of religious books continued until the end of the nineteenth century and the number of books published by

¹² Quoted in Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire,” p. 144.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46.

¹⁴ For a comprehensive discussion of British policy in India, see for example Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). As for the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago, see Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950* (Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993).

Muslims exceeded one million.¹⁵ Similarly, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian government also offered the same flexibility to the Jadid movements that sought to redefine Muslim identity by combining a European social organization with a Muslim religious and cultural basis.¹⁶

C. Adaptation and Cooperation during the Czarist Government

At the end of the nineteenth century, history witnessed the advance of European colonialism in almost all parts of the Muslim world. If during the previous century, European colonial agents still focused on military and economic conquests, in the nineteenth century, they already moved ahead by developing a more sophisticated subjugation such as spreading European forms of knowledge in education, applying law of procedures to Islamic court, and introducing political ideology in the form of nationalism. Muslims in Russia and Central Asia were by no mean immune from the ideological currents that surrounded them. Like many other Muslims in different part of the world, some Muslim figures in Russia were also in need of preserving Islam and maintaining its purity, not by armed resistance, but by cooperating and adapting Islam to the realities of the modern world.

The form of cooperation and adaptation of Islam to the realities of Russian politics was multi faceted. Since the eighteenth century, the reinterpretation of Islamic teaching to the modern reality became a serious project among Muslims in the Russian empire. However, the focus of their movements were limited to internal affairs among Muslims, that is, to respond to the traditional view of Islam, and not to offer ideological bargains to the Russians. One of the most remarkable Muslim intellectuals who represented the idea of the adaptation of Islam

¹⁵Zenkovsky writes that during the period 1853-1859, Kazan University alone published 326,700 copies of the Quran and other books in Tatar, and in the decade 1854-1864 the number of books published by the Tatars exceeded one million. See Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 26.

¹⁶The Jadid movement was born around the final years of Czarist rule and focused on educational reform. Their opposition, the Qadim or the status quo, wished to retain an identity based on a traditional Islamic social and cultural base. For further discussion of these movements, see, *inter alia*, Ahmet Kanlidere, *Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars (1809-1917): Conciliation or Conflict?* (Istanbul: Eren, 1997).

to modern realities was Abu Nasr Qursavi (1783-1814), who was a teacher in a Bukharian madrasah. Qursavi was known for his idea of breaking with the traditionalist view of Islam, which dominated the spiritual life of Russian Muslims. During his life, challenging the status quo of the Russian *ulama* was seen as an act of rebellion. Qursavi decided to flee to Istanbul after being condemned to death by the Emir of Bukhara and accused of impiety by the *mufti* of Orenburg.¹⁷

After Qursavi, Russian Muslims also witnessed another Muslim intellectual who advocated a clear break with the old *ulama*, that was personalized in the activity of Shihab al-Din Marjani (1818-1889). Marjani fought all his life to rid Islam of the dogmatism of traditional theology and to prove that Islam could be, as it was in the past, perfectly compatible with progress and modern science. He denounced blind obedience to traditional authority (*taqlid*), and advocated the right of every believer to derive their own interpretation of religion (*ijtihad*) based on the scripture. Moreover, he also urged Muslims to imitate of the West while at the same time to preserve the integrity of their Islamic faith.¹⁸

Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914), another key Muslim figure during the Czarist government, also voiced a form of cooperation that offers concrete ideological bargaining with Russian empire. He received his higher education in Bakhchisarai and Moscow and was exposed to political atmospheres of Paris and Istanbul, which eventually lead him to the ideological current and intellectual trends among his contemporaries. Two most important ideological currents that influenced his movement were the Young Ottoman and Pan-Islamic movement. The former was initiated by Kemal Pasha, Shinasi Efendi, and Zia Pasha, which aimed to Turkey's revolutionary cultural and literary Europeanization, whereas the latter was a product of the Muslim thinker and reformer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). Jamal al-Din and his Pan-Islamic movement were known for their campaign of purifying Muslim religious practices from superstition and vulgar popular beliefs, as well as raising the Muslim's intellectual and educational standards. They also aimed at liberating Muslims from Christian European colonialism and unifying

¹⁷ Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 70.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Muslims into one federation of states.¹⁹ However, unlike Al-Afghani and Pan-Islamic movement, Gasprinsky refused to accept the idea of the radicalism of the Muslim world against the encouraging West such as in Russia. Likewise, he also condemned the so-called ‘Westernisers,’ that is those who considered that the salvation of Islam lay in the imitation of European civilization, for their uncritical and submissive attitude.²⁰

One of Gasprinsky’s major contributions to the Muslim masses was his idea of unity, that is, unity of language, mind, and action. Gasprinsky was aware of the potential strength of the unity of Muslims in the form of pan-Turkism. He was convinced that the decline of Muslims was only temporary and that the future of humanity belonged to the Turkic Islam. Therefore, he urged Russian Turks to unite on the basis of their similar culture and religion. However, he was very careful in his attitude toward the Ottoman and the Russian state to avoid political backlash. In this regard, he promoted continual existence of both the Russian and Ottoman. He wrote, in his pamphlet published in 1896, “Muslims and Russians can plow, sow, raise cattle, trade, and make their livings together or side by side.”²¹ Gasprinsky also regarded that Russians and Muslims are bound by fate to work together. In one of his famous article published in 1905, he wrote, “Russians and Turk are bound together in a huge common plain extending from the foothill of the Altai and Pamirs to the swamps of the Baltic sea...Such it was in the past, and in the future these people will understand that they must walk hand in hand in order to find the way of life they both need.”²²

Gasprinsky also insisted that the most preferable partner for Muslims were Russian. Of all European nations, Russia was the closest to Islam. In fact, Russia and Muslims had maintained eight centuries long relationship which had resulted mutual understanding between the two.²³ More than merely a partnership of living together in Russian land, Gasprinsky even moved further to build partnership on equal terms for the conquest of the world and fight against British domination. In one of his pamphlets he said: “Let us imagine that Russia entered

¹⁹ Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 31.

²⁰ Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, pp. 78-79.

²¹ Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, pp. 31-33.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 79.

into friendly relations with Turkey and Persia...Russia would become kindred to the entire Muslim East and would certainly stand at the head of Muslim nations and their civilization, which England is attempting so persistently to do."²⁴

Gasprinsky offered the full support of the Muslims to Russians for a hope that Muslims would have total religious and cultural freedom and absolute equality with the rest of Russians. Thus, Gasprinsky's idea of cooperation meant to establish the mutual benefits of Russians and Muslims. From the Muslim side, the benefit meant equality and the preservation of the Islamic faith and Turkic identity as Russian Muslims. Later, we find that Gasprinsky failed to materialize his idea of Turkic unity not only because the Czarist government was unable to respond to his appeal, but also because of the complexity and the diversity of Russian Muslims, even though the majority of them were the Turkic-speaking peoples.²⁵

Yusuf Akchura Oğlu (1876-1933), a Tatar intellectual, voiced similar idea as that of Gasprinsky's. He proposed a Muslim partnership with the Russians by joining to one Russian liberal party; the 'Constitutional Democrat.' A brief bio-bibliographical record of Akchura Oğlu shows that he was from a rich family of industrialists in Simbirsk, and graduated from Istanbul and French universities. He entered his first political career as one of the founders of the great Muslim political party, Ittifaq al-Muslimin. After joining the 'Constitutional Democrat' and becoming the member of its Central Committee in 1905, he tried to make use of the party's prestige and influence at the Duma. His purpose was to voice the Muslim demands for cooperation and through legal action at the constitutional level. Although he was finally elected a Deputy at the first Duma, his dream of Russian-Muslim partnership was proven a utopia when all the Russian liberals of the 'Constitutional Democrat' did not agree with a single demand presented by him and other Muslim delegates at the Duma. Like the Czarist government, the Russian liberals failed to deal with their Muslim fellow citizens, let alone to hold their

²⁴ Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 34.

²⁵ Hiro notes that Gasprinsky's idea of promoting the unity of Turkic speaking people failed because the reality of the various Turkic dialects had matured as languages in their own right. See Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 5.

national aspiration.²⁶

Even after the failure of Gasprinsky and Akchura Oğlu, Muslims in Russia still witnessed another effort to build a Russian-Muslim partnership in the monarchy systems. In spring 1906, another movement, which is called the Tangchylar (“Those of the Morning Star”), was founded to voice similar aspirations in the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries political program. This movement, however, did not survive.²⁷

All these movements, from Qursavi, down to Gasprinsky, Akchura Oğlu and the Tangchylar movements show the desperate attempts of Muslims to adapt Islam and to build real political cooperation with the Russians. Despite of the internal divergence among Muslims, and that many these movements failed, the desire to build an ideological cooperation with the Russians indicates a critical juncture at which Muslims started to exercise political *ijtihad* which was unprecedented in their history. The nineteenth century Muslims of Russia imagined that their relationship with the Russians does not mean subjugation by the Russian side, but a cooperation that may complement the Russian idea of modernization, while at the same time preserving their Islamic faith.

D. Adaptation and Cooperation during the Early Soviet Period

During the Soviet period, the official policy toward Muslims was relatively the same as under the previous regime. Islam as an institution became the subject of political and ideological assault by the State and the Communist party. However, Islam was not the only religion that was persecuted. Buddhism, Judaism, Protestants and Catholics as well as the Orthodox met all the criteria for persecution by the Communist.²⁸ In the case of Islam, the official policy makers of Moscow and the Communist leaders considered this religion as the substantial factor that would influence the internal and external policies of the regime. For this particular reason, the Soviet government continued a pragmatic policy toward Muslims. During the early period of the Bolshevik revolution, the Communist leaders sought Muslim’s support and ignored the very

²⁶ Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, pp. 79-80.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

²⁸ For discussion of religion during the Bolsheviks, see Wladyslaw Kania, *Bolshevism and Religion*, trans. R. M. Dowdall (New York: Polish Library, 1946).

fact that there would be an ideological conflict between communism and Islam, even though both Lenin and Stalin were aware of the aspirations of the Muslims toward pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.

The Bolshevik leaders imagined a Russian people, a new community in which all people share single identity as Soviets and all contribute to the development of the new community. Within the idea of the Soviet man, Lenin, Stalin, and other Bolshevik leaders believed that Muslims too could be part of the new community and to achieve the ideal goal together. They regarded Russia's Muslims as potential allies of the revolution, which claimed to defend the interests of all economically dispossessed and socially deprived people. They portrayed the Czarist government as 'a prison of people' and skillfully exploited the previous economic policy and therefore attracted Muslims by promising freedom from exploitation. In addition, they also promised national equality and the right to self-determination, and a fair redistribution of land and wealth to all Muslims.²⁹ For example, in one of his public messages, Lenin was known to have said:

“All of you whose mosques and prayer houses used to be destroyed, and whose beliefs and customs were trodden underfoot by the Tsars and oppressors of Russian! From today, your beliefs, customs, your national and cultural institutions are free and inviolate. Organize your national life freely and without hindrance. You are entitled to this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all peoples of Russia, are protected by the whole might of the Revolution and its agencies, the Soviets of workers, soldiers', and peasants' deputies. Support, then, this Revolution and its sovereign Government... Comrades! Brothers! Let us march towards an honest and democratic peace. On our banners is inscribed the freedom of all oppressed peoples.”³⁰

On other public occasions, Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders were also known to have said that there was no conflict between the Soviet system and Islam. They even spoke favorably about the Shari'a and promised the preservation of the Islamic courts in the certain regions of Russia.³¹ Likewise, Muslim intellectuals and political leaders

²⁹ Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*, pp. 101-02.

³⁰ Quoted in Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, p. 11.

³¹ Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*, p. 103.

put some hopes in the Bolshevik leaders and believed that they could contribute to the new reconstruction of Russian society. This voluntary cooperation with the Bolshevik leaders should be understood as not only a mean to preserve faith, but also as an attempt to reconcile socialism and religion and to find a solution for the Muslim political problem. One of the major factors that motivated Muslims to band with the party was their dissatisfaction the White Armies' leaders whom they think incompetence and cannot accommodate the Muslim national aspirations. Stalin's personal influence and Lenin's promise to give Muslims the right of secession added more affinity to the communist's goal. Adding this fact together, Muslims pinned their hope to the October Revolution and were confident that it would be the first step towards their liberation.³²

One may also look how some prominent Muslims in Central Asia became the supporters of the Bolshevik. The approach of two particular Bolshevik leaders, V. Kuibyshev and M. Frunze was reported to be the major factor of gaining Muslims' support. These two Bolsheviks recognized local specific demands that were related to Islam, the local customary norms, and institution. Particularly, they emphasized the Bolsheviks' positive attitude to the Shari'a courts. As the result, not only Kuibyshev and Frunze won supporters among the liberal Muslims of Central Asia, but also supporters among the radical. Therefore, in November 1917 in Tashkent, for example, the Muslim supporter of the Bolshevik created the Soviet Government, the Sovnarkom (the Council of People's Commisars) of Turkestan. Three years later, the Muslim of Turkestan even moved further to adapt Shari'a to Soviet civil legal norms.³³

From the point of view of the local Central Asian economic interests, one may also add that the Bolsheviks brought hope for reconstruction of the economy that had been hampered by Czarist monopoly control over the cotton production industries. As Bacon pointed out, "economic development can be described as a general displacement of certain local products by manufactured goods from Russia, which resulted in business failures and significant changes in the good and services provided by Central Asia merchants. Cotton which had been a crop raised for local consumption became under the Russian

³² Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 81.

³³ Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*, p. 109.

administration.”³⁴ The Bolshevik revolution, in terms of local Central Asian economic development was seen as the end of Russian economic domination.

Although the Bolsheviks were still in the process of controlling all Russian territories, and they were not yet sure how they would implement Marxist theory among the non-Russian populations, Muslims believed that the new socialist order would accommodate their emancipation. Muslim leaders certainly knew that religion was not the interest of the Communists. If there was a concern for religion, it was a concern addressed to the Orthodox Church’s extensive identification with the state, not to the Muslims of Russia.³⁵

Muslims who put hope in the Bolshevik also understood that Marx, Engels, and Lenin displayed little interest in assaulting popular religious belief. Their ideology suggested that religion, as part of the superstructure, would be irrelevant as a consequence of socio-economic transformation and dissemination of knowledge. Persecution and repression, in this case, were futile. Lenin, for example, said in 1905 that “religious humbugging of mankind would cease with the end of economic slavery.” He also added that “it is necessary to take care to avoid hurting the religious sentiments of believers, for this only serves to increase religious fanaticism.”³⁶

In contrast to Lenin who avoided a direct contact with popular religious belief, the Muslims who supported the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to continue to voice their disagreement to the status quo of the *ulama*. Their disagreements were not only visible in political movements, but were also found in Muslim literature written during the early period of the Bolshevik. One of best representative examples was from Abdulah Qadiriy, known as one of Uzbek men of letters flourished prior to the Bolshevik revolution. Qadiriy was critical of the traditionalist *ulama* or the Qadim who were still holding religious authority. In one his major publications, *Tinch Ish* (Easy Work), he mocked the class of

³⁴ Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 105-115.

³⁵ Bräker, “Soviet Policy toward Islam,” p. 163.

³⁶ Larry E. Holmes, “Fear No Evil: Schools and Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941,” in Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.) *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 126.

mullahs and the wealthy who, in his view, have no appropriate knowledge to deal with modern problems. He, for example, wrote a parody about a mullah who spent two to three decades studying in madrasah and yet only knew about science and geography. The mullah deficiency in the latter is evident in the characterization of America as a tribe of the Franks who worked with lacquered leather and the English as the rulers of the sea, simply because they built their cities on the ocean. So much for his intelligent, the mullah finally found a permanent position a prayer leader.³⁷

After the Bolshevik revolution, however, Lenin realized the possible danger of Muslim political aspirations. The disagreement that previously existed among Muslims, between the Jadid and the Qadim, developed into Muslim political aspirations, which was slightly different than that of the Communist leaders. To explain that this political aspiration was at odds with Lenin's systematic Sovietization program in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus and Transcaucacus, is to state what is obvious. Muslims were considered as threatening the stability of the Soviet regime because of their idea of nationalism. The Bolshevik leaders argued that their proletarian revolution had destroyed Czarist imperialism in order to end exploitation by all national bourgeoisies. Therefore, they would never tolerate Muslim bourgeoisies who want to exploit Muslim workers and peasants.³⁸

This then is the beginning in which the cooperation and self-adaptation of Islam grew into conflict with the Communist party. We may refer, for example, to Sadri Maksudi, who, on behalf of the Milli Mejlis (the National Council), which was created in July 1917 at the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress, negotiated cooperation with the Bolsheviks. However, Maksudi arrived to a different conclusion than Lenin and Stalin, which was to create a separate Islamic communist party and to form a national-cultural autonomy for the Turko-Tatar Muslims of the Volga Ural. As the result, the Bolsheviks banned Maksudi and his nationalism was considered a form of bourgeois nationalism.³⁹

The case of Sultan Galiev is also significant here. In the beginning

³⁷ Christopher Murphy, "Abdullah Qadiriy and the Bolsheviks: From Reform to Revolution," in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change* (Durham and London: Duke University, 1992), pp. 190-195.

³⁸ Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, p. 11.

³⁹ Yemelianova, *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*, pp. 100-101.

Sultan Galiev believed that Bolshevism was the only solution to the dire socio-economic and national problems of Russia. He and his comrades all agreed with the Bolshevik idea of the Sovietization of Muslims. However, unlike the Bolshevik's goal, Sultan Galiev imagined the idea of Sovietization as a full freedom from Russian domination and control, which the Communist's leader were not prepare to accommodate. This different interpretation was considered unorthodox and therefore cannot be tolerated by the Communist leaders.⁴⁰

After the first decade of the Bolshevik revolution, all major Muslim political aspirations to join the Bolsheviks were banished by Stalin. However, the fact that Muslims tried build strategic alliances and cooperate with the Bolsheviks, with the main purpose to preserve Muslim interests such as the application of Shari'a beside the Soviet Civil law, proved that Muslims were not at all times against the communists. The aspiration of Muslims to join the Bolsheviks must be seen as an original attempt to reconcile Islam with modern politics, in this case is the communist ideology. This attempt, in addition, was not merely a way to preserve the faith, but also a result of a constructed imagination about the future of Muslims in Russia.

E. The Optimism of the Official Islam

After the period of the Bolsheviks, we still witness another form of Muslim cooperation with the communist government, which may have been unprecedented in Muslim modern history. Unlike the adaptation during the early period the Bolshevik revolution, which was shaped by the liberal political aspirations of Muslims to join the Bolsheviks, the adaptation of Islam after the World War II was confined to the official policy directed by the communist government. Working behind the official policy of the government, the so-called 'Official Islam' had a limited opportunity to articulate Islam and is therefore represented on more as subservience to the government.⁴¹ Nevertheless, their work with

⁴⁰ For discussion about Sultan Galiev, see Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, pp. 82-85.

⁴¹ Ro'i considers Muslims position as subservient in a negative way and therefore implies that Muslims were subdued. He stated: "Although from time to time an *imam-khatib* in one of the functioning mosques would try to prevent the erosion of religion in his community in defiance of the authorities, registered clergy was largely subservient.

the government was no less than a creative attempt to adapt Islam and to guide Muslims into the reality of living under the Communist system.

The nature of the subservience of the Official Muslims to the government cannot be separated from the previous events that resulted in an open conflict with the Communist leaders. We must note that since Bolshevik leaders could not confine the idea of Islamic nationalism among Muslim leaders, they began to use force against Muslim leaders and Islamic institutions. Since 1920, the Bolshevik leaders started their destructive policy against Islamic institutions. Mosques, the Muslim clergy, and the Muslim's property of the waqf were all the target of direct control. In addition to that, Muslim activities in the fields of education and jurisprudence were also terminated, as they were considered irrelevant to the Marxist-Leninist's goal. Subsequently, atheistic propaganda was directed specifically to demonstrate the backwardness, harmfulness, and more significantly, the incompatibility of Islam for goal of the new socialist society.⁴²

Muslims of the official range considered their appointment to government offices as an opportunity to adapt Islam to the new atmosphere of the Soviet regime. The fact that their appointment represented the mere pragmatic policy of the communist regime did not affect their optimism to cooperate with the government. They held this position not only because they wanted to prevent the erosion of religion among Muslims, but also to continue to exercise Islamic values in a different political context.

One must note that the official appointment of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate was organized at the time when the Soviet state had temporarily halted its persecution of religion in an effort to enlist the support of all its citizens, believers and non-believers alike, for the defense of the motherland.⁴³ Here, Muslim leaders appointed to the directorate

The people who function in, and under the auspices of, the four spiritual directorates that continue to operate until the end of the Soviet period, were on the whole unquestioning lickspittles who accepted without reservation the constrain and limitation imposed by the regime. See, Ro'i, "The Secularization of Islam and the USSR's Muslim Areas," p. 10.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴³ The Spiritual Directorate is divided geographically into four directorates, led by an executive committee presided over by a *mufti*, or in the case of Shi'i in Baku, by Sheikh al-Islam; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in

performed their functions extra-carefully so as not to directly oppose the Communist government. They also cautiously respond to the ongoing atheistic propaganda and demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with science and modernity, and ultimately with the Communist ideology.⁴⁴

From the collection of various sources, both official and non-official documents, we are able to gain some information that describes the function of the Spiritual Directorate and the content of their fatwās. The function the Spiritual Directorate does not confine itself to the defense of traditional doctrine, but to explain the substance of doctrine in a larger context. Thus, for example, when the mullah of Osh was asked about the compatibility of Islam and Communism, he stated:

You, Marxists, simply do not understand the profoundly communist essence of Islam. If one reflects upon the teachings of Muhammad, then it becomes clear that we, the Muslims, and Communism are marching elbow to elbow toward the fulfillment of the ideals of Muhammad.⁴⁵

Similarly, the imam of the Moscow mosque repeatedly states that “Islam gives the people the right to revolution,” which was explicitly an Islamic justification of the Bolsheviks revolution. The mullah of the Chistopol, N. Mofluikhanov, when he was asked whether he could see a conflict between the belief in the existence of God and an acceptance of the discoveries of science, said that “as one cannot see Reason, one cannot hold it, or prove that it exists, one cannot see the Almighty Allah; and the proof of the fact that He exists shall never be found.”⁴⁶

More than responding to general questions about the compatibility of Islam and Communism, the members of the Spiritual Directorate were also the firm supporters of communist policy. Thus, for example in

Tashkent; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia in Ufa; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of European Caucasus and Daghestan in Buynaksk, then in Makhach-Kala; the Spiritual Directorate for the Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims of Transcaucasia in Baku. For further discussion of the spiritual directorate, see Alexandre Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejey Chantal, “Islam in the Soviet Muslim Republics,” in Olivier Carré (ed.), *Islam and the State in the World Today* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987), pp. 142-44.

⁴⁴ Azade-Ayse Rorlich, “Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims,” *Central Asian Survey*, Volume 1, 1 (1982), p. 29.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

1948, they were reported to have issued *fatwās* to limit Muslims' adherence to their rituals in order to prevent material damage that might occur to the economy. So they stated that Muslims must always go to work even during their religious festivals; fasting Ramadan is not obligatory for certain categories of people; animal sacrifice and the payment of the zakat was no longer compulsory as poverty became irrelevant under conditions of socialism.⁴⁷

The appropriation of Islamic rituals to the Communist economic program, one may argue, can be considered a blasphemy to formal Islamic doctrine. Be that as it may, nowhere can we find evidence that the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims had equated the Islamic faith with communist ideology. That there were similarities between communism and the social concepts derived from Islamic teaching no longer needed further explanation. However, the mullah, khatib, and the imams, who were under the Spiritual Directorate still firmly considered that their faith was superior to atheism. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the mullah and imam still gained support from the community despite their innovation to cooperate with the Communists and being loyal to them. As such, they served more than just caretakers of Islam during the Soviet period. With their ability to keep the integrity of the faith while maintaining the relationship with the Soviet power, they actually played a role in maintaining ideological balance between Islam and communism.

F. Conclusion

From the foregoing paragraphs, we have noted that the history of Muslims in Russia is not merely the history of conflict, but also the history of people who attempted to find balance between Islam and their Russian realities. Although for their most part, Muslims fell under the political control of Russian governments, Muslims not always considered themselves as subjugated subjects or as a defeated community. The long experience of Muslims living under the Czar, during the early period of the Bolshevik revolution, and after the Bolsheviks, represents more of a long term dynamic of Islamic intellectual articulation of Russian politics, than an experience of a defeated people. Muslims from all generations attempted to find the middle way in which they could preserve their faith

⁴⁷ Ro'i, "The Secularization of Islam and the USSR's Muslim Areas," 10.

and implement Islamic teachings for themselves and as a contribution to the Russian people at large. Although we have noted that there was not much that Muslims could do and offer to the Russian governments, their cooperation with regimes indicated that Islamic political aspirations did not always mean direct confrontation with the secular regime.

What we have seen from Abu Nasr Qursavi (1783-1814), Shihab al-Din Marjani (1818-1889), and Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914) in their effort to adapt Islam to their political context must be seen as a desperate attempt by Muslim intellectuals to deal with the dilemma of holding the old doctrine in the modern reality. These Muslim leaders were in the same situation as other Muslims who lived in Turkey, British-India, Egypt and the Netherlands Indies. However, their interaction with the Czar and their various theological and socio-historical backgrounds shaped their ideology in a different way from the rest of Muslims outside the Russian empire. At the end, their adaptation had a huge impact on other Muslims outside Russia who also put the same hope on the secularization of the Communist system. The emergence of the communist party in the newly born nation states of the Muslim world at the dawn of British and French colonialism was an outcome of the experience of the Russian Muslims with the Communist system. Whether the party survived or not, it would not change the fact that Muslims had shared the same optimism with all Russians.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allworth, Edward, "Encounter," in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, a Historical Overview*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994.
- Bacon, Elizabeth E., *Central Asians under Russian Rule*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Lemerrier-Quellejey Chantal, "Islam in the Soviet Muslim Republics," in Olivier Carré (ed.), *Islam and the State in the World Today*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987, pp. 131-58.
- Bräker, Hans, "Soviet Policy toward Islam," in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 157-82.
- Cohn, Bernard S., *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: HarperCollins, 1994.
- Holmes, Larry E., "Fear No Evil: Schools and Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," in Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 125-57.
- Kania, Wladyslaw, *Bolshevism and Religion*, translated by R. M. Dowdall. New York: Polish Library, 1946.
- Kanlidere, Ahmet, *Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars (1809-1917): Conciliation or Conflict?*, Istanbul: Eren, 1997.
- Kappeler, Andreas, "Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire," in Edward Allworth (ed.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 141-56.
- Murphy, Christopher, "Abdullah Qadiriy and the Bolsheviks: From

- Reform to Revolution,” in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.) *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham and London: Duke University, 1992, pp. 190-202.
- Ro'i, Yaacov, “The Secularization of Islam and the Ussr’s Muslim Areas,” in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 5-20.
- Rorlich, Azade-Ayse, “Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims,” *Central Asian Survey*, Volume 1, 1 (1982), pp. 5-42.
- Schubel, Vernon, “Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of the Naqshbandi Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan,” *Paper presented at the Conference of Naqshbandis in Western and central Asia: Change and continuity*, Swedish Reserach Institute Istambul June 9-11 1997.
- Steenbrink, Karel, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950*, Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993.
- White, Hayden, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1973.
- Yemelianova, Galina M., *Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2002.
- Zenkovsky, Serge A., *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960.