

# THE RESPONSE OF MUHAMMADIYAH TO THE BILL OF NATIONAL EDUCATION OF 1988

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## Abstraksi

Semenjak munculnya Orde Baru dan adanya restrukturisasi lembaga DPR, ada beberapa kebijakan pemerintah yang menimbulkan reaksi penentangan dari organisasi-organisasi Islam. Di antara kebijakan tersebut adalah Peraturan Pemerintah yang menghilangkan libur sekolah selama bulan Ramadhan. Karena munculnya berbagai penentangan dari organisasi-organisasi Islam dan kelompok umat Islam yang lain terhadap peraturan tersebut menyebabkan turun tangannya Presiden dengan mengambil jalan tengah, yaitu meliburkan satu minggu pertama dan sepuluh hari terakhir dari bulan Ramadhan. Perubahan terhadap kebijakan pemerintah ini menunjukkan kekuatan umat Islam dalam melindungi kepentingan mereka. Berpangkal dari peristiwa di atas, tulisan ini mencoba melihat reaksi Muhammadiyah terhadap kebijakan yang hampir sama meskipun berbeda esensi dan waktunya, yaitu RUU Pendidikan Nasional tahun 1988.

RUU Pendidikan Nasional yang terdiri dari 18 Bab dan 60 Pasal, oleh Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Fuad Hasan diharapkan dapat merangkum kebijakan-kebijakan pendidikan yang komprehensif, dari tujuan pendidikan nasional, dasar filosofi pelajaran agama dan status sekolah-sekolah agama. Secara umum Muhammadiyah menilai bahwa RUU tersebut dapat diterima kecuali beberapa bab yang berhubungan dengan tujuan pendidikan nasional, posisi pelajaran agama pada setiap jenjang pendidikan, posisi sekolah agama dan swasta dalam sistem pendidikan nasional serta sanksi terhadap lembaga yang tidak melaksanakan undang-undang tersebut. Menurut Muhammadiyah RUU ini mendescreditkan mata pelajaran agama karena mata pelajaran tersebut hanya diajarkan pada jenjang pendidikan tertentu. Di samping itu RUU tersebut tidak menghargai pendidikan agama karena hanya mengizinkan pendirian sekolah agama sampai pada tingkat menengah. Lebih dari itu, hilangnya kata "iman" dari tujuan pendidikan nasional yang selalu disatukan dengan kata "taqwa" dianggap dapat memudarkan iman umat Islam, khususnya generasi mudanya.

## ملخص

بعد ظهور النظام الجديد وتجديد مجلس الشورى، هناك قرارات الحكومة التى تبعث المعارضة من الجمعيات الاسلامية. ومن تلك القرارات هو القرار عن عدم تعطيل المدارس طوال شهر رمضان. جعلت المعارضات العديدة ظهور تقرير رئيس الجمهورية الذى يثبت عطلة الاسبوع الاول والايام العشرة الاخيرة من رمضان. هذا التغيير يحقق قوة المسلمين فى رعاية منافع الاسلام. اهتماما من تلك الحادثة تناقش هذه المقالة رفض جمعية محمدية على القرار المتساوى بالقرار السابق رغم اختلاف المادة وزمن ظهوره، وهو قانون التربية الشعبى.

يرجو وزير شؤون التربية، فؤاد حسن، ان يستطيع القانون جمع قرارات الحكومة حول التربية من اغراض التربية والمبدأ الفلسفى للمواد الدينية وموقف المدارس الدينية. ترى محمدية أن معظم مواد القانون مقبولة الا ما فى بعض الأبواب المتعلقة بأغراض التربية الشعبية وموقف المواد الدينية فى كل طبقة وموقف المدارس الدينية ضمن نظام التربية الشعبية ثم حكم من لا يطيع القانون. ترى محمدية أن القانون لا يهتم بالمواد الدينية لأنها لا تدرس الا فى بعض طبقات التربية المعينة بل أنه لا يهتم التربية الدينية لأنه لا يسمح إقامة المدارس الدينية إلا فى الطبقات الابتدائية إلى المتوسطة. زيادة على ذلك إن ذهب كلمة "الايما" التى تشارك كلمة "التقوى" فى أغراض التربية الشعبية تعنى تضعيف إيمان المسلمين وخاصة شبانهم.

### I. Introduction

Since the political ascendance of the *Orde Baru* (the new order) and the restructuring of the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or the *D.P.R.* (the peoples Legislative Assembly) after the General Election of 1971, there were a number of government policies which created an uproar among the Muslim organizations. One of them was the 1978 Ordinance which canceled the one-month holiday of Ramadan and in which the government was adamant about its abolition in spite of the appeal of almost nearly all Islamic forces. Leaders of those forces demanded its reconsideration due

to its contradiction with earlier regulations.<sup>1</sup> Some of them even went as far as accusing the initiator of the ordinance, the Minister of Education Daoed Joesoef, of being the agent of secularism.<sup>2</sup> They were convinced that the abolition of the Ramaḍān holiday did not seek to facilitate the school curriculum by providing more days for annual school year, but was solely aimed at banishing the Islamic tradition from the educational sphere.<sup>3</sup> These Leaders became more agitated as they charged Joesoef of having connection with the Christian sponsored "Center for Strategic International Studies," or CSIS, which provided him with the concept of a national Educational policy.

In his defense, Joesoef stated that even in countries where Islam was the State Religion, Ramadan received no privilege and schools were not closed accordingly.<sup>4</sup> He argued that the main motive for this cancellation was the pure wish to increase the number of days in the annual school calendar, since it was high time for the Department of Education to decide which school holidays should be eliminated in response to the demands for better education, which in turn demanded a more efficient use of time.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, he held that as long as the Ordinance was not opposed to any stipulation prescribed in the *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, (the 1945 Constitution), there was no authority with the power to cancel it.<sup>6</sup> The Muslims were not prepared to accept joesoef's argument which he claimed to be solely, motivated by the desire to promote the national education, regardless of the means that he employed to pursue such an advancement.

Nearly all Islamic organizations filed their complaints with the government. Some of them sent delegates to conduct a deliberate consultation with the President in order to convince him that the Ordinance did not conform with the 1950 Ordinance which allowed private schools to arrange specific holidays in so far as the minimum annual number of school days was fulfilled.<sup>7</sup> They also argued that the new Ordinance undermined the longlived tradition of the Ramaḍān holiday, which had served as a chance to upgrade school children's religious practices, so that their spiritual observance would be more maintained. Hence, owing to the strong opposition of Muslims, the President interfered in the debate and took a solution, in which he decided that the government granted a week off at the beginning of Ramaḍān and ten days at its end.<sup>8</sup>

Muslims thus have showed an ability to exercise a "preasure" to the decision maker so that their interests would be protected. The key executive figure in handling this controversial issue determines the government's willingness to accommodate the Muslim inclination and to make concession. It should be noted that the plan to cancel the holiday of Ramadhan had been earlier introduced by Syaref Thayeb, the Minister of Education and Culture before Joesoe. Before announcing the plan to the public, Thayeb communicated it to Muslim leaders to test their reaction. And upon discovering their hostility to it and having it labeled by Hamka, the contemporary chairman of the Council of Indonesian 'Ulama' or M.U.I. (*Majlis Ulama Indonesia*), as an "un-Islamic proposal", Syaref Thayeb finally decided to dissolve his plan.<sup>9</sup> This, however, does not mean that the government always bowed to their demands or negotiated a compromise with them whenever they raised objections to the government's policies. To illustrate this point, one may cite the time when the government refused to acknowledge the Muslim refusal to accept the Aliran Kepercayaan (Local Spiritualism) as part of the spiritual system in the *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* or *G.B.H.N.* (the National Guidelines Policy).<sup>10</sup>

This paper will use the approach that Muslims took in their attempt to dislodge the implementation of the Ordinance of 1978 as a pattern to investigate how *Muhammadiyah* responded to a similar case, namely the Bill of National Education of 1988. This is in spite of the fact that this case conveyed a different message, occurred at a different time, 1988, and was initiated by a different figure. The response of *Muhammadiyah* to the Bill of 1988 is certainly more vehement since the Bill of 1988 devised the whole system of national education and extended from the objectives of education and its technical operations to the position of religious subjects in the curriculum and the status of religious schools within the national structure of education.<sup>11</sup> *Muhammadiyah* was chosen to represent the response of other Muslim organization to the Bill of 1988 because its major works focused on educational activities. In addition, *Muhammadiyah* had a past experience in dealing with a controversial educational issue. It was *Muhammadiyah* which opposed the Teacher Ordinance of 1921 (Goeroe Ordonnantie) and publicly sponsored a protest against this Dutch policy.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, in the case of the Ramaḍān holiday, *Muhammadiyah* persisted in closing its schools during that month in spite of the President's concession to Muslim demands.<sup>13</sup>

## II. Muhammadiyah: An Educational Organization

Since its establishment in 1912, Muhammadiyah had paid the greater part of its attention to educational projects as required by its statutes. The fact that the creation of this organization on was marked by the establishment of a modern school in 1912 in Kauman Yogyakarta, the abode of its founding father Ahmad Dahlan, indicates the emphasis this movement places on education.<sup>4</sup> In fact, other social services did not figure on its agenda until the early 1920s, when *Muhammadiyah* founded a Public Rescue Team in 1921 to help the victims of the Mount Kelud eruption. It should be kept in mind that this public Rescue Team had been founded earlier as an autonomous organization before it was integrated into the Muhammadiyah in 1912.<sup>15</sup> And only in the following year that *Muhammadiyah* established its first orphanage and four years later several clinics were established.<sup>16</sup>

By the time *Muhammadiyah* providing other social services in the 1920s, its educational institutions had made considerable progress, as explained in their numerical record as well as in their territorial expansion. By 1925, *Muhammadiyah* had established 152 school including both general and religious schools. One of the factors leading to the rapid success of its schools is the fact that they offered both religious and secular subjects, which were very appealing to the demands of urban Muslims. This trend was in line with the basis of recruitment of its followers, who were mostly middle class Muslims living in urban areas. Furthermore, their cultural expectation was fulfilled by the pedagogy of *Muhammadiyah* school which, due to their teaching of modern sciences, provided a means to pursue an upward mobility. *Muhammadiyah* was able to cooperate quite easily with the secular *Budi Utomo* since both were bound by the same goal, namely the promotion of modern education to the natives. The amicable relationship between the two can be seen from the fact that seven of the leading supporters of *Muhammadiyah* were members of the *Budi Utomo*.<sup>17</sup>

At the early stage development, the religious schools were still in the majority. In a later development during the 1930s, the ratio of religious vs secular schools changed, when the former composed more or less ten percent of the total number of schools. This ratio can be seen from the fact that the number of religious schools shrank to 20 as opposed to 207 general schools.<sup>18</sup> The decrease in number of religious schools

came as a result of the mounting Muslim demand for secular education that were more suited for the need of the time. In addition, the dissemination of both Christian and secularist education through modern school founded by Christian missionaries and secular nationalists also contributed to decision to increase its general schools. This trend lasted until Independence, as reflected by 1957 statistic conducted by its board of education showing that religious schools numbered 682 while general schools numbered 877.<sup>19</sup>

The devotion of the greater part of its attention to educational activities left little room for *Muhammadiyah* to conduct any direct political exercises. The fact that *Muhammadiyah* remained aloof from political agitation benefits its schools, since by so doing the Dutch provided its schools with subsidies. Unlike the *Taman Siswa*, which also sought to introduce modern education but did not resort to government's subsidies, *Muhammadiyah* accepted subsidies and the latter even protested when the colonial government gave a bigger allocation of fund to Christian missionary schools. The protest was officially filed during *Muhammadiyah's* annual meeting in 1925.<sup>20</sup> As a native organization, Muhammadiyah was certainly wary of the colonial policies, but this was only the case when they dealt with education.<sup>21</sup>

The emphasis on its educational mission did not abate after Independence, nor was it deleted or changed from its policy statement, even though many conventions were held after 1945 to revise the statutes of the organization. For instance, in 1957 when the convention was held to revise the *Khittah Perjuangan* (the Guideline of the Mission), education remained a dominant section in the Chapters of its revised statutes.<sup>22</sup> Education played a central position in the *Muhammadiyah* movement after Independence not only because it served as a means of raising the level of Muslim education, but also as a means of disseminating its reformist ideology. It was believed that its schools were the best place to prepare and train the new leadership cadres to which goal it was committed. This commitment led to the inclusion of "*Muhammadiyah* Studies" as an obligatory subject for all student in its schools.<sup>23</sup> It should be mentioned that in fact the *Muhammadiyah* schools failed to fulfill the hope of the organization since they turned to function more as the place of learning knowledge than as the arena of disseminating the spirit of reform.<sup>24</sup> despite of the failure, *Muhammadiyah* still kept its commitment to preserve education as the main goal of the movement. This can be seen

by the fact that the organization reemphasized the prominent place of education in its agenda in the Surakarta convention of 1985.<sup>25</sup>

In this post-Independence era, general schools have remained numerically superior in the overall number of *Muhammadiyah* schools. These schools, which received more attention than their religious counterparts in terms of facilities and instructors, began to acquire a high reputation and were much sought after. On the other hand, his uneven policy in running both kinds of schools had precluded the religious schools from producing graduates that are highly qualified in the Islamic sciences. Consequently, *Muhammadiyah* was unable to create the select class of *ulama* that it wanted due to the poor quality of its religious education. In addition, *Muhammadiyah* did not have a sufficient number of *Pondok Pesantren* (the Residential Religious Schools), where the members of the *ulama* class normally received their intensive religious training. Apart from the reasons mentioned above the fact that *Muhammadiyah* had put an emphasis on the secular education showed its pragmatism and an immediate concern with material needs. This outlook in its due course of time degenerated concern with the religious training which indeed could not be undermined if the religious label of its movement should be tacitly maintained. It was in an attempt to eliminate this deficiency that some of its leaders proposed the establishment of special religious schools to train the new members of the *ulama* class as well as upgrading the condition of existing religious schools. By so doing, *Muhammadiyah* would have a basis of recruitment to staff its *Majlis Tarjih* (the Council of Fatwa).<sup>26</sup>

From this brief account, it can be inferred that *Muhammadiyah* deserves credit for its contribution in the process of developing and introducing modern education not only to Muslims, but also to Indonesians in general. Thus, due to its longer tradition in running public schools *vis-a-vis* other Islamic organizations, *Muhammadiyah* was expected to play a leading role in any confrontation with the policy makers in the Department of Education. The latter which is renowned for having been run by non-committed Muslims in the past, had the potential of upsetting the Muslim. It was only ten years earlier that controversy broke out with the Muslim over the Ordinance of 1978. This incident was a precursor of the controversy of 1988 concerning the Bill of National Education.

### III. Muhammadiyah's Response to the Bill of National education of 1988

The Constitution of 1945 mentions that every Indonesian citizen is entitled to receive education and that the government is responsible for providing a national system which regulates the administrative as well as the technical aspects of education.<sup>27</sup> Five years after Independence, the government issued the Ordinance of 1950 which laid down the foundations on which the educational system was built. This Ordinance was made to serve the needs of the regions which were still under the jurisdiction of the United Republics of Indonesia or *RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat)*.<sup>28</sup> After the unification of the Republic, the 1950 Ordinance was elaborated and expanded through the incorporation of new sections pertaining to vocational schools, kindergatens, higher educational institutions and others.<sup>29</sup>

However, with the passage of time this Ordinance could not cope with the speed of development in the educational sector, particularly after the formation of the New Order. Thus, in the late 1970s the Department of Education formed the Committee for the Reformation of National Education or *KPPN (Komisi Pembaharuan Pendidikan Nasional)*. Which was entrusted with the formulation of the Bill of National Education. Daoed Joesoef, the then Minister of education, expected the work of K.P.P.N. to provide comprehensive guidelines for catching up with the speed of developments in the educational sphere. Due to ambiguous reasons, the work of the K.P.P.N. could not be proposed to the D.P.R. Similarly, joesoef's successor Nugroho Notosusanto, who also wanted to reintroduce the work of K.P.P.N., equally failed to bring the work into the purview of the D.P.R.<sup>30</sup>

The Minister of Education after Notosusanto, Fuad Hasan, who engineered the birth of the Bill of National Education of 1988, claimed that none of the educational policies initiated by his predecessors as reflected in the work of the *K.P.P.N.* was incorporated into the Bill of 1988.<sup>31</sup> Yet, he believed that the Bill of 1988, which consisted of 18 Chapters and 60 Articles, was equally intended to embody a comprehensive policy of education stretching from the objectives of national education and its philosophical foundation to the position of religious subjects in the curriculum and the status of religious schools.<sup>32</sup>

In general, the contents of the Bill were considered by *Muhammadiyah* sound and acceptable except for those chapters dealing with the objectives of national education, the position of religious instruction across the different educational levels, the position of religious and pri-

vate schools within the structure of national education and the sanctions imposed by the authorities upon the violators of the regulations.<sup>33</sup> *Muhammadiyah* believed that the religious subjects, which had been embodied in the curriculum of all the educational levels, received a disproportionate treatment in the Bill, which demanded that religious subjects be taught at certain grades only. Moreover, the Bill discredited religious education, by allowing the establishment of religious schools at the secondary level only.

This shaky position of religious education alarmed the leaders of *Muhammadiyah* who formed the *Panitia Kecil* (the Small Committee) to prepare a well-drawn reaction to the Bill.<sup>34</sup> H.S. Prodjokusumo, one of the chairmen of the Central Board of *Muhammadiyah*, examined the content of the Bill and discovered three points which required revision. 1. The fact that the religious subjects were only taught at the elementary school meant that the *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (the Islamic Elementary School) had no right to exist. 2. The establishment of Islamic schools was limited to the secondary level only. 3. The *Pondok Pesantren* was not recognized as part of the existing educational system in Indonesia.<sup>35</sup> Prodjokusumo was convinced that the implementation of such regulations would not only cause a serious loss to Muslim educational right but would endanger the faith as well.<sup>36</sup> He further argued that while the establishment of the *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* reflected the Muslim concern to safeguard the faith of their children by providing them with religious instruction as early as possible, the *Pondok Pesantren* had actively participated in the development of Islamic learning in Indonesia as well as the creation of the '*ulama*' class.<sup>37</sup> Prodjokusumo maintained that the *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* and the *Pondok Pesantren* came into existence as a by product of the history of Indonesian Muslims, whose cultural as well as intellectual achievements could not be separated from the contributions of these two educational institutions.<sup>38</sup>

He further argued that even the Ordinance of 1950 allowed for religious subjects in the syllabus of all grades.<sup>39</sup> Prodjokusumo held that the foundation of religious schools was not a matter of promoting human interest, but a faithful rendering of a religious obligation. He believed that the creation of religious schools was mandatory in Islam since the *Qur'an* decrees that "You should appoint among you those who appeal the people for Islam."<sup>40</sup> The phrase "those who appeal people to Islam," he said indicated a certain section within the Muslim society that commanded a

thorough knowledge of Islam. Such a knowledge, he further argued, could only be acquired through a long and studious religious education.<sup>41</sup>

Needless to say, this religious justification intensified *Muhammadiyah's* opposition to the Bill of 1988. In a hearing with the *Fraksi Karya Pembangunan* or *F.K.P.* (Functional Group Faction) of the D.P.R. one of Muhammadiyah delegates declared that a struggle to restore Muslim rights and to reestablish religious education is a matter of life or death. For the leaders of *Muhammadiyah* not only did the Bill disregard Muslim aspiration, but it was also heavily imbued with secular thinking. They viewed that the efforts at secularization were manipulating education as a means of implementing the process of secularization.<sup>42</sup>

The fact that *Muhammadiyah* became so agitated over the Bill of 1988 is quite understandable. One must not forget that apart from the religious obligation which contributed to the opposition to the Bill, many of *Muhammadiyah* schools, which totaled 14,427<sup>43</sup> became under the threat of closing down, if religious schools were only allowed at the secondary level. Also, the exclusion of religious subjects from its general schools would have removed the distinctive character of its pedagogy. Thus, one can see that this issue really struck at the very pillars of *Muhammadiyah's* mission and was the force behind its bitter opposition to the Bill. Hence, *Muhammadiyah* formed the *Panitia Kecil* even before the President had sent a letter of authorization for the Bill to the chairman of the D.P.R. on May, 23, 1988.

*Muhammadiyah* was considered among the earliest Muslim organization to lodge its complaint to the government. *Nahdlatul Ulama* or *N.U.* (the Awakening of Religious Scholars) which also ran a great number of Islamic schools,<sup>44</sup> had kept aloof from the debate on this sensitive issue as acknowledged by K.H. Asad Syamsul Arifin, the Mustashar (the Counselor) of the Advisory Board of the *N.U.* When Arifin initiated the protest to the Bill, it was on the capacity of an individual and not as a Mustashar to the *N.U.*<sup>45</sup> Nonetheless, Muhammadiyah's initiative was later followed by other Islamic organization which issued a statement supporting any action taken by Muhammadiyah to oppose the Bill.<sup>46</sup>

In addition to the points criticized by Prodjokusumo, Muhammadiyah still found in many part of the Bill articles which discouraged the development of future Muslim education. For instance, in Article 16, the Bill mentioned that "education at the secondary level consist of public schools and vocational schools, such as religious schools." Furthermore,

in this Article the status of Islamic secondary schools was mentioned in an explanatory note.<sup>47</sup> To group religious schools among the vocational schools was contradictory to the philosophical basis of national education, which had long treated religious and general schools on the same footing. While vocational schools were established to meet the demand for temporary practical skill, *Muhammadiyah* argued, the religious schools were mandatorily established to teach the eternal message of Islam and to disseminate its truth among its followers.

In addition, Article 4 mentioned that one of the aims of educating Indonesian was to create devoted (*taqwa*) Indonesians. However, since the word *taqwa* (devotion) went hand in hand with the word *iman* (faith), it was surprising that the latter was not specifically mentioned. To mention the word *taqwa* only was defective since the *G.B.H.N.* stipulated that education should create Indonesians who possessed the two moral qualities defined in the words *taqwa* and *iman*.<sup>48</sup> Thus, it was argued that since the *G.B.H.N.* was superior to the Bill, the objectives of education seemed to be insufficient and should be adjusted to meet the requirements of the *G.B.H.N.* It was believed that the issue was not a matter of word choice since the word *taqwa* obviously does not signify the same meanings as the word *iman*.<sup>49</sup> Rather, the omission of the word *iman* was intentionally made in order to undermine the role of religion.<sup>50</sup>

When Article 19 of the Bill regulated higher learning, the religious subjects were left out from the syllabus :

The operation of higher education is delegated to universities which are in charge of getting the participants of the higher learning process ready to acquire a good command of science, technology and the arts and to provide them with a professional mentality in the disciplines of their choice.<sup>51</sup>

This article disregarded the fact that the religious element, which had been embodied in the syllabus of higher learning for many years, was highly authoritative. All students, regardless of their areas of study, were required to take it and a failure in it meant a retention of their degree. The article also ignored the stipulation made by the *G.B.H.N.* that religious subjects must be taught at all levels of education.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, *Muhammadiyah* affirmed that, apart from the stipulation of the *G.B.H.N.* religious subjects had constituted an integral component of the curriculum for a long time and should be developed and promoted in the present era

of modernization when the spiritual dimension is to balance the material progress of the age.<sup>53</sup>

The fact that the Bill did not mention the *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* or *I.A.I.N.* (the State Institut of Islamic Studies) as part of higher learning system in Indonesia was another example of the Bill's mistreatment. Unlike the religious secondary schools, which were explicitly mentioned in the Bill, the *I.A.I.N.*, which was founded following the Presidential decree of 1962, received no treatment from the Bill which claimed to embrace all aspects of education in Indonesia. The Bill had surprisingly disregarded the participation of the *I.A.I.N.* in the development of Islamic higher learning in a country where Muslims constituted the majority of the population.<sup>54</sup>

An Article on private schools was also one of the issues that bothered the *Muhammadiyah* since it severed all state's ties and association from the private schools. Such an act was unacceptable since the *G.B.H.N.* had defined the role of the private schools as a *mitra* (a close partner) of the state in providing national education.<sup>55</sup> Thus, *Muhammadiyah* proposed that the Bill should emphasize the *kemitraan* (close partnership) between the private schools and the government in their endeavor to achieve the maximum outcome of education.<sup>56</sup> *Muhammadiyah* stated that the government's involvement in directing and supporting the private schools was essential, particularly in matters related to the provision of educational facilities. Although the subsidies that the *Muhammadiyah* schools received from the government were insignificant, they were nevertheless instrumental, particularly those which could enhance the accreditation of its schools. *Muhammadiyah* which ran no less than 14,427 schools from kindergartens to universities could not undermine the worth of the government's support.<sup>57</sup>

As for the violators of the state regulation, the Bill imposed severe sanction. In Article 7, the Bill mentioned that schools refusing admission to applicants on the basis of gender, religious affiliation, ethnic origin or social status would be taken to court and threatened with years of imprisonment or fined a maximum of five million *rupiahs*.<sup>58</sup> This Article discounted the fact that some of Islamic schools did not apply a co-education system and did not admit male and female students in the same institutions for religious reasons. Thus, if the Bill had not been revised, those schools would have closed down and would have become the victims of this unrealistic Bill.<sup>59</sup>

Another section criticized by *Muhammadiyah* was the stipulation in Article 20 requiring all universities to possess such facilities as a library, laboratory, *bengkel* (machine shop) and sport facilities. If the standard requirements could not be met by a university, the Bill decreed that the government would fine it ten million rupiahs or one year of imprisonment for its staff.<sup>60</sup> This regulation was very alarming to *Muhammadiyah* for out of 140 faculties affiliated to its 43 universities, only those which were located in big cities possessed the state-required standard facilities.<sup>61</sup>

Chairman of the central Board of *Muhammadiyah* held a number of meetings with the authorities in the Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs and members of the *D.P.R.* in an attempt to convince them of the incompatibility of the Bill with Muslim aspirations. Then, on August 2, 1988, six members of its Central Board met Fuad Hasan, the contemporary Minister of Education, and expressed their discontent at the mistreatment of religious instruction and schools by the Bill. In the dialogue, the Minister admitted that at first the Bill included religious instruction in the curriculum but due to the expansion of some of its Articles, stipulations on religious instruction became invisible (*tidak kelihatan*).<sup>62</sup>

And in response to *Muhammadiyah's* argument that the Bill contradicted the *G.B.H.N.*, Hasan replied that since the Bill was prepared before the enactment of the *G.B.H.N.*, unavoidable contradictions occurred between the two in some of its articles. However, since the contradictions were not fundamental, solutions could be made by simply accommodating the stipulations of the *G.B.H.N.*, he stated. *Muhammadiyah's* delegation expressed its satisfaction after the meeting and declared that in principle the Minister had acknowledged the delegates objections which he considered well-argued and worthy of consideration.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, two days after the dialogue with Fuad Hasan, *Muhammadiyah* sent the same delegation to Munawir Sjadzali, the Minister of Religious Affairs. In the meeting, Sjadzali, who had met Hasan earlier, cited Fuad Hasan's word and declared that religious instruction would not be left out from the syllabus and religious schools would receive an official recognition in the version of the Bill.<sup>64</sup>

Since the *D.P.R.* had the authority to ratify the Bill, *Muhammadiyah's* dialogues with its members became crucial. In these meetings, *Muhammadiyah* voiced the Muslim concern over the sensitive issue of

education as well as the latter's fear of losing their educational rights if the Bill was ratified as it was. In the dialogues with the *Fraksi Karya Pembangunan* or *F.K.P.* (the Functional Group Faction), the *Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan* (the United Development Faction), and the *Fraksi A.B.R.I.* (the Indonesian Armed Force Faction), *Muhammadiyah* questioned the compatibility of the Bill with the existing regulations and its conformity to the stipulations of the *G.B.H.N.* All three factions agreed with *Muhammadiyah* to a large extent and promised to base their actions on the stipulations of the *G.B.H.N.* and to use it as only authoritative reference point for settling controversies over the Bill. By saying so, they had indirectly affirmed the unquestionable of religious education and the necessity of its maintenance as prescribed by the *G.B.H.N.*<sup>65</sup>

The Bill of National education did not only distress *Muhammadiyah*, but also provoked the sentiments of other Islamic associations throughout the country.<sup>66</sup> *M.U.I.*, for example, agreed with *Muhammadiyah* and expressed the same objections as the latter had done.<sup>67</sup> *M.U.I.* had also engaged in dialogues with the Minister of Education and with some members of the three factions in the *D.P.R.*, namely the *F.K.P.*, the *F.P.P.* and the *Fraksi A.B.R.I.* Moreover, before meeting with the Minister of Education, *M.U.I.* had set up a series of meeting with several Islamic organizations as well as with some Indonesian experts on education, whose views *M.U.I.* needed in order to formulate well drawn arguments against the Bill.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, after the exchange of views between the functionaries of *M.U.I.* and the Minister of Education, a favorable understanding was reached as reflected in the statement made by *M.U.I.* declaring that the Minister of Education had promised to make substantial changes to the parts of the Bill which proved contradictory to the existing regulations.<sup>69</sup>

Unlike *Muhammadiyah* and *M.U.I.* who did not touch the work of the *K.P.P.N.*, *Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* or *Perti* (the Union of Islamic Education) believed that the Bill of 1988 should accommodate the guidelines of the *K.P.P.N.* of 1979 and used the latter as a stepping stone to develop further arguments against the new educational policy. The *K.P.P.N.* of 1979 regarded religious instruction as an indispensable subject and admitted its significance in regulating human life and providing moral bases for people.<sup>70</sup> The members of the *K.P.P.N.* included experts on education, prominent figures in educational professions as well as delegates of organizations whose primary mission was education. The

*K.P.P.N.* also took cognizance of public opinion, which it had acquired through the mass-media. If the Bill of 1988 had accommodated the work of the *K.P.P.N.*, the stipulation of the Bill would not have deviated from the values and traditions extant in society, *Perti* argued. Knowing that the Bill did not provide clear stipulations nor a proportional status for religious instruction or schools, *Perti* suggested that the name of the Bill be changed to *Rencana Undang-Undang Pokok Pendidikan* (the Bill of General Guidelines of Education).<sup>71</sup>

Meanwhile, *N.U.* adopted a different view believing that the makers of the Bill had no intention whatsoever of damaging Muslim rights. Nevertheless, Abdurrahman Wachid, the chairman of the Executive Board of *N.U.* promised that *N.U.* would join the Muslim action against the Bill and declared that the Executive Board was seeking the best way to review the Bill.<sup>72</sup> This promise, however, never materialized since from the time the *D.P.R.* opened debates on the Bill until its ratification on March 6, 1989, no official statement was made by *N.U.*<sup>73</sup> The absence of *N.U.* from the debates on the Bill crisis confirmed its aloofness and justified K.H. Asad Syamsul Arifin's anticipation as mentioned earlier. Unlike *N.U.* the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah* (the Assembly of Islamic Propagation) was very apprehensive of the Bill and its chairman, Muhammad Natsir, quickly sent a letter to the Minister of Education outlining his organization's stand. In his letter, Natsir strongly suggested that the Minister withdraw the Bill, unless he made substantial changes to the points creating uneasiness among Muslims.<sup>74</sup>

After each of the factions of the *D.P.R.* gave its comments and reviews on the Bill, Fuad Hasan made an official reply to the *D.P.R.* in September, 1988, underlining Articles which led to criticism from members of the *D.P.R.* He said that to conform with the *G.B.H.N.* and to accommodate public (Muslim) aspirations, some Articles had undergone substantial changes. Moreover, the objectives of the education were specified as being in quest for moral uprightness as defined in the words *iman* (faith) and *taqwa* (devotion). Another Article also highlighted the significance of both religious instruction and schools, formal and informal alike, in the educational sphere so that the goal of preparing devoted and faithful Indonesians could be attained through education.<sup>75</sup> He also touched on the position of private schools saying that they functioned as close partners of the government in providing education to the Indonesian citizens.

The *D.P.R.* then formed the *Panitia Khusus* or *Pansus* (Special Committee) to solicit views of each of the factions and to coordinate them with the views presented earlier by the Minister of Education in his official reply. Thus, on March 6, 1989, the three factions, the *F.K.P.*, the *F.P.P.* and the *Fraksi A.B.R.I.* unanimously accepted the work of the *Pansus*. However, the *Fraksi Demokrasi Indonesia* or *Fraksi P.D.I.* (the Indonesian Democratic Faction) raised an objection to a stipulation in Article 28 obliging instructors of religious subjects to profess the religion that is being taught and to share the same religion as the students. The *Fraksi P.D.I.* demanded the removal of this stipulation in a consultation meeting held before the plenary session. Nevertheless, the other three factions remained consistent in their approval of the work of the *Pansus* and refused the demand of the *Fraksi P.D.I.*<sup>76</sup>

It was the Christian flank of the *Fraksi P.D.I.* which found in Article 28 a discriminatory stipulation. Acceptance of the stipulation meant that Christian schools should hire Muslim instructors to teach Islamic subjects to their Muslim students who comprised a considerable body of the student population. Besides, the introduction of Islamic subjects in the Christian schools would remove the proselytizing character of their schools by making religious instruction other than Christianity.<sup>77</sup> However, the Bill of National Education was finally passed by the *D.P.R.* and named *the Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional* (the Law of the System of National Education). The law, which consisted of 20 Chapters and 59 Articles, was promulgated by the government after President Suharto signed it on March 27, 1989.<sup>78</sup>

The promulgation of the law once again marked the victory of the Muslim organizations after long struggle in opposing the "un-Islamic" stipulation of the Bill. All of their demands, as reflected in the points of objection raised by *Muhammadiyah*, were fully accepted. Moreover, this Law which became imbued with Muslim aspirations eventually provided more solid ground to survive and to develop in Indonesia, a country where Muslims constitute the majority of the population.

#### IV. Conclusion

The Bill of National Education of 1988 received serious attention from *Muhammadiyah* not only because *Muhammadiyah* was concerned with all forms of educational arrangements, but also because this Bill in its eyes contained numerous matters which were in conflict with Muslim

aspirations and guidelines of the *G.B.H.N. Muhammadiyah* responded immediately to the Bill by setting up a team to prepare its basic ideas on this Bill. Furthermore, *Muhammadiyah* concentrated on particular issues considered harmful to Islam, such as the absence of the word *iman* (faith) as distinct from the word *taqwa* (devotion) in the educational objectives as well as the unclear inclusion of religious education and schools. *Muhammadiyah's* effort yielded maximal outcomes and all points in its basic argument were accommodated in the law. It is noteworthy that during the discussion of the Bill, a situation conducive to Muslim aspirations opened up.

### End Note

<sup>1</sup>"M.U.I. sesalkan Keterangan Menteri P. dan K." *Suara Muhammadiyah* (May, 1979), 4.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*; Lagi Pendapat Tentang Tidak Libur Puasa," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (June, 1979), 9.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>"SK 0211 Menteri Daed Joesoef Sebakkan Presiden Ambil Kebijaksanaan," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (June, 1979), 9.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 10

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> See "Lagi pendapat Tidak Libur Puasa," 9: during the colonial rule, schools like Holland Inlandse School, Schakel School, Normaal School, Kweek School and Osvia were closed during the month of Ramaḍān. H.M. Djarnawi Hadikusumo, "Masalah Liburan Puasa," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (June, 1979), 3.

<sup>8</sup>"Liburan Sekolah Bulan Puasa," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (June, 1979), 3.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>10</sup> During the debate on the issue of *Aliran Kebatinan* in the *Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or *M.P.R.* (the People's Consultative Assembly), members of the Islamic-based political party, the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or *P.P.P.* (the United Development Party) walked out. For details, see Ubaidi Radi. *Strategi PPP* (Jakarta: Integrita Press, 1988).

<sup>11</sup> Fuad Hasan, *Rancangan Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional, Mei 1988* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1988).

<sup>12</sup> In this policy, any Islamic teacher was required to obtain a teaching license from the local rulers before being allowed to teach. Therefore, at the First Al-Islam Congress held in Cirebon in 1921, *Muhammadiyah* placed the issue of the Teacher Ordinance on the top of the Congress' agenda and asked the Colonial authorities to withdraw this ordinance. Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Press, 1989), 211.

- <sup>13</sup> H.A.R. Fachruddin, "Kita Meliburkan Puasa," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (August, 1979), 3.
- <sup>14</sup> Takhesi Sharaeshi, "Islam and Communism An Illumination of the People's Movement in Java, 1912-1926" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca New York, 1986), 228.
- <sup>15</sup> Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Muslim di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 90.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid*
- <sup>17</sup> *Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Sepanjang Masa* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1983), 4-5.
- <sup>18</sup> C. Penders, "Colonial Education and Practise in Indonesia, 1900-1942," (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, Brisbane, 1968), 189.
- <sup>19</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, "Khittah Muhammadiyah Tahun 1956-1962," in *Himpunan Keputusan-Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1973), 22.
- <sup>20</sup> M.T. Arifin, *Muhammadiyah Potret yang Berubah* (Surakarta: Institut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat, Sosial, Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990), 49.
- <sup>21</sup> The Colonial government argued that the unprecedented growth of private schools which were inadequately equipped could damaged the standard of education. Penders, "Colonial Education yang Practise in Indonesia," 205. As mentioned earlier, *Muhammadiyah* had led the Islamic organizations in protest against the Teacher Ordinance and demanded its cancellation. Also, in 1932 when the Dutch government issued the Wild School Ordinance (Wilde Scholen Ordonnantic), *Muhammadiyah* vehemently opposed it since the Ordinance hampered the natives from enjoying the learning opportunity provided by the so-called "Wild Schools." And although the Ordinance primarily sought to control the unchecked growth of the *Taman Siswa* schools, *Muhammadiyah*, joined by other organizations held a mass-meeting in Yogyakarta to demonstrate the public discontent with this and just policy to the Dutch. John Engelson, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement* (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), 206.
- <sup>22</sup> "Khittah Muhammadiyah 1956-1962," 22.
- <sup>23</sup> See Chapter III, Article 10 in *Pimpinan Muhammadiyah Jawa Timur. surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah* (Surabaya: Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah Jawa Timur, 1976).
- <sup>24</sup> Umar Hasyim, *Muhammadiyah Jalan Lurus* (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1990), 140.
- <sup>25</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Keputusan Mukhtamar Muhammadiyah ke 41 Surakarta* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1985), 6-7.
- <sup>26</sup> Ahmad Azhar Basyir, "Ulama, Majelis Tarjih dan Kaderisasi dalam Muhammadiyah," *Pembaharuan*, 1 (Desember, 1985), 17.
- <sup>27</sup> see Chapter VIII, Article 31 of the *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*.
- <sup>28</sup> Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan R.I., *Sekilas Mengenal Proses Pembaharuan RUU Tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional di Tingkat DPR* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional di Tingkat DPR (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1988), 10.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>31</sup> Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Undang-Undang Pendidikan* (Jakarta: Penerbit Pustaka Panjimas, 1990), 14.

<sup>32</sup> Hasan, *Rancangan Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional*, Mei 1988.

<sup>33</sup> Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Undang-Undang Pendidikan*, 8.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> H.S. Prodjokusumo, "Pendapat Tentang RUU Pendidikan Nasional," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (1988), 8-9.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>37</sup> The position of the *Pondok Pesantren* could not be undermined as it constituted a large part of the traditional educational institutions which had no less than 6000 *Pesantrens* and accommodated over one million *santris* (student of the *Pesantrens*). "Dilemma Pesantren dan RUUPN," *Kompas* (September, 9, 1988).

<sup>38</sup> Prodjokusumo, "Pendapat Tentang RUU Pendidikan Nasional," 9; a number of '*ulama*' and leaders of the *Pondok Pesantren* from different areas made the following joint statement: "On behalf of the '*ulama*' and leaders of *Pesantrens*, we regretfully cannot accept the Bill of 1988 since it is clearly in contradiction with the *G.B.H.N.* and other existing educational regulations. "They appealed to the *D.P.R.* and the *M.U.I.* to seriously review parts of the Bill which became the source of worry for Indonesian Muslims. If the Bill had been passed in its original format, it would have caused a dramatic loss for future Muslims. "Pernyataan Sejumlah Ulama dan Pimpinan Pondok Pesantren," *Pelita* (July, 18, 1988).

<sup>39</sup> Prodjokusumo, "Pendapat Tentang UUPN," 9; he referred to the Ordinance of 1950 which recognized the existence of religious schools at both the elementary and secondary levels. "RUUPN Belum Cerminkan Undang-Undang di Negara Berkembang," *Kompas* (August 15, 1988).

<sup>40</sup> the Qur'an, 4: 10.

<sup>41</sup> Prodjokusumo, "Pendapat Tentang UUPN," 9.

<sup>42</sup> "Getaran Agamis Lewat Sekolah: Ramai-Ramai Soal RUUPN Ada Kekhawatiran Teologis dalam Pendidikan," *Editor*, 1 (September, 3, 1988), 46.

<sup>43</sup> This figure was given on the 1985 report. See H.A.R. Fachruddin, "Laporan Ketua Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Pada Resepsi Pembukaan Muktamar ke-41 di Stadion Sriwedari tgl. 7 Desember, 1985," in *Siapa Yang Tidak Tahu Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I., 1989), 14.

<sup>44</sup> Abdurrahman Wachid, chairman of the Central Executive Board (Tanfidhiyah) of the *N.U.* estimated that *N.U.* had about 21000 schools in 1988. "Menunggu Suara N.U.," *Editor*, 1 (september 3, 1988), 46.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*; Arifin in his protest indicated points of "weakness" in the Bill particularly in the article stipulating the objectives of national education. He filed his objection formally when he met two members of the *D.P.R.* in early August, 1988. "RUUPN Belum Cerminkan Undang-Undang di Negara Berkembang," *Kompas* (August 15, 1988).

<sup>46</sup> "Al-Wasliyah Dukung Sepenuhnya Pendapat Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah," *Suara Muhammadiyah* (1988), 10.

<sup>47</sup> Hasan, Article 16 in *RUUPN*.

<sup>48</sup> Chapter "Agama dan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan yang Maha Esa, Sosial Budaya," in the *G.B.H.N.*

<sup>49</sup> "Boram yang Belum Tuntas," *Tempo* (August 6, 1988).

<sup>50</sup> "Pendapat P.B. H.M.I. dan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah," *Suara Pembaharuan* (August 24, 1988).

<sup>51</sup> Hasan, Article 19 of the *RUUPN*.

<sup>52</sup> Chapter "Agama dan Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Sosial Budaya," of the *G.B.H.N.*

<sup>53</sup> "Cantumkan Pendidikan Agama dalam RUUPN," *Angkatan Bersenjata* (August 24, 1988); the inclusion of the religious subjects into the curriculum was made as early as 1946, when the joint policy of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and education obliged the teaching of religious subjects in the public schools. The position of the religious subjects were later reaffirmed through a sequence of educational regulation enacted by the department of Education and the *Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (Sementara) or *M.P.R.(S)*. (provisional Consultative Assembly). The Department of Education issued two Ordinances, namely those of 1950 and 1954, while the *M.P.R.(S)*. issued a number of regulation known as Tap *M.P.R.(S)*. of 27, 1966, 4, 1973, 4, 1983 and 4, 1988. Munawir Sadzali, "Keterpaduan Pendidikan Agama dan Umum Perlu Dijabarkan," *Pelita* (september 20, 1988).

<sup>54</sup> "Cantumkan Pendidikan Agama."

<sup>55</sup> Chapter "Agama dan Kepercayaan terhadap tuhan yang Maha Esa, Sosial dan Budaya," of the *G.B.H.N.*; see also "Tanggapan Pimpinan Muhammadiyah: Banyak Hal Perlu Diperbaiki dalam RUUPN," *Kompas* (July 15, 1988).

<sup>56</sup> "RUUPN Perlu Tegaskan Peran Swasta sebagai Mitra," *Suara Karya* (August 28, 1988).

<sup>57</sup> departemen Penerangan R.I., *Siapa Yang Tidak Tahu Muhammadiyah* (jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, 1986), 14.

<sup>58</sup> Hasan, article 7 in the *RUUPN*.

<sup>59</sup> "Tanggapan Pimpinan Muhammadiyah."

<sup>60</sup> Hasan, Article 29 of the *RUUPN*.

<sup>61</sup> Fachruddin, *Laporan Ketua Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah*.

<sup>62</sup> "Dari Pertemuan Mendikbud dan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah," *Panji Masyarakat* (August 20, 1988), 11.

<sup>63</sup> "Dari Pertemuan Mendikbud," 11.

<sup>64</sup> Harun, *Muhammadiyah*, 34.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>66</sup> The Bill did not only create a reaction from the Islamic organizations which had officers in Java, but it had also provoked responses from those in the outer islands, such as *Nadhlatul Watan* of Lombok, the *Darut Dakwah wal Irsyad* of Celebes, the *Yayasan Pondok Pesantren* of Lampung and others. "Sanksi Pidana Agar Dihindari dalam RUUPN," *Suara Pembaharuan* (September 19, 1988).

<sup>67</sup> M.U.I., however, added an additional element when dealing with the minimum level of mandatory education for Indonesian citizens. "MUI Optimis Pelajaran Agama Masuk UU Pendidikan Nasional," *Pelita* (September 6, 1988).

<sup>68</sup> "MUI dan Pimpinan Ormas Islam Cemas Tentang Materi RUUPN," *Pelita* (september 12, 1988); for M.U.I.'s statement refuting some points of the Bill, see "Saran-saran MUI Terhadap RUU Pendidikan Nasional," *Pelita* (september 9, 1988).

<sup>69</sup> "MUI dan Mendikbud Capai Saling Pengertian Soal RUU."

<sup>70</sup> "Perti: RUU Sebaiknya Menjadi RUU Ketentuan Pokok Pendidikan," *Antara* (September 4, 1988); see the statement of Slamet Imam Santoso, the chairperson of the *K.P.P.N.* in "RUU Pendidikan Mengebiri Hak Legislatif," *Pelita* (August 11, 1988).

<sup>71</sup> "Perti: RUU Sebaiknya Menjadi RUU Ketentuan Pokok Pendidikan."

<sup>72</sup> "Menunggu Suara NU," *Editor*, 1 (September 3, 1988).

<sup>73</sup> Harun, *Muhammadiyah*.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> "Menggelinding Tanpa Ketegangan."

<sup>77</sup> the *Fraksi P.D.I.* also questioned another stipulation of the same Article which stated that to be eligible for a teaching profession, a person must believe (*iman*) and be devoted to (*taqwa*) God and have a genuine loyalty to the State Philosophy of *Pancasila* and the *U.U.D.* 1945. "Peraturan Pelaksanaan Penjelasan Pasal 28 Agar Disusun Bijaksana," *Suara Pembaharuan* (March 14, 1989)

<sup>78</sup> "UU-SPN Resmi Berlaku," *Kompas* (April 14, 1989).