

SAREKAT ISLAM: ITS RISE, PEAK AND FALL

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Abstrak

Artikel ini menelusuri perkembangan Sarekat Islam, gerakan nasionalisme awal terbesar di Indonesia, dari sejak kelahiran, perkembangan, kejayaan sampai kemundurannya. Kelahiran organisasi ini disebabkan oleh berbagai faktor. Persaingan ekonomi antara pribumi dengan pengusaha Tionghoa dengan kekalahan di pihak pertama merupakan penyebab utama kelahiran organisasi ini. Hal ini nampak dari nama awal Sarekat Islam (SI) yaitu Sarekat Dagang Islam yang mencerminkan bahwa kepedulian utama organisasi ini adalah perdagangan terbukti dari berbagai kegiatan yang dilaksanakan pada masa pembentukan ini. Samanhudi (1868-1956) yang mengalami langsung dominasi pedagang Tionghoa yang memonopoli bahan-bahan mentah pembuatan batik tampil sebagai orang pertama yang menghimpun kekuatan pedagang pribumi. dibantu oleh Raden Mas Tirtoadisuryo, yang selain berpengalaman sebagai manajer perdagangan juga sebagai wartawan, organisasi ini berkembang dengan pesat. ketika organisasi ini melebar ke Surabaya, Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, yang juga pegawai sebuah firma dan lulusan sekolah Belanda untuk mempersiapkan para pegawai pemerintah tingkat rendah (OSVIA), menjadi salah seorang yang menonjol di organisasi ini dan popularitasnya terus meroket ke tingkat nasional sehingga menjadi pemimpin puncak organisasi ini.

Dibawah kepemimpinan Tjokroaminoto, SI berkembang dengan pesat sampai ke tingkat kejayaannya. Hal ini antara lain disebabkan oleh kemampuan dan kharisma Tjokroaminoto sendiri dalam memobilisir massa dan merekrut orang-orang terdidik dan berpengalaman untuk berkiprah dalam Sarekat Islam. Kondisi masyarakat yang memerlukan sebuah organisasi yang bisa mewakili kepentingan mereka berhadapan dengan peme-

rintah Belanda maupun persaingan pedagang Tionghoa juga mempunyai andil dalam kebesaran SI. Keanggotaan organisasi ini juga sangat terbuka dan longgar: para Muslim santri, abangan dan priyayi tidak canggung untuk bekerjasama dalam organisasi ini; para petani, kyai, pedagang, wartawan sampai birokrat pribumi bahu membahu membesarkan organisasi ini. Para pemimpin Sarekat pada masa puncak ini juga masih lunak dalam menyikapi kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintah kolonial Belanda. Karakteristik-karakteristik tersebut berangsur-angsur hilang dari Sarekat Islam seiring dengan melemahnya kekuatan dan kebesaran organisasi ini.

Kemundiran Sarekat Islam disebabkan berbagai faktor. Para pemimpin maupun pengikut Sarekat Islam semakin berani dan radikal memprotes kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintah kolonial. Tjokroaminoto dan Agus Salim sendiri sebagai pemimpin puncak SI berani keluar dari dewan perwakilan rakyat (*volkstraad*) karena dianggap sebagai tak lebih dari "lelucon" belaka. Para pengikut SI di tingkat lokal (*grassroot*) juga semakin berani berkonfrontasi terbuka dan bersenjata menghadapi kebijakan-kebijakan yang timpang pemerintah kolonial maupun kondisi ekonomi yang dianggap menguntungkan pedagang Tionghoa. Tak ayal lagi, sikap pemerintah kolonial Belanda terhadap SI berubah menjadi garang dan berusaha sekuat tenaga melemahkan kekuatan SI. Perpecahan di tingkat elit kepemimpinan SI yang pada gilirannya juga memecah belah kekuatan umat mempunyai andil yang cukup besar dalam meredupkan cahaya kebesaran SI. Pukulan terberat adalah keluarnya faksi Islam abangan dari tubuh SI yang tergabung dalam SI Merah dan kemudian bergabung dalam gerakan komunis Indonesia. Para anggota Muhammadiyah dan Persatuan Islam pun dikeluarkan dari organisasi ini; sementara para Muslim tradisional sejak 1926 memiliki wadah organisasi sendiri. Belum lagi persaingan dari gerakan nasionalis sekuler seperti Partai Nasional Indonesia yang mulai muncul dan merebut pengaruh massa. Tjokroaminoto, yang semula diagungkan-agungkan sampai dianggap sebagai ratu asil, redup kharismanya dan malah dicaci maki dengan berbagai tuduhan. Akhirnya, orang meninggalkan Sarekat Islam bagaikan "selesai menonton pertunjukan wayang".

ملخص

تناقش هذه المقالة تاريخ هيئة "شاريكة إسلام" (S I)، وهي أول هيئة وطنية وأكبرها بإندونيسيا منذ ظهورها حتى سقوطها. هناك دوافع دفعت ظهور هذه الهيئة. التنافس في مجال الاقتصاد بين أبناء البلد والتجار الصينيين كان دافعا رئيسيا لظهورها. وهذا الدافع ظاهر في اسمها السابق "شاريكة داغانج إسلام" (S D I)، فانهصر اهتمامها الاساسى حول التجارة كما تعرف من نشاطاتها في الأيام الأولى. سامنهودى Samanhudi (١٩٥٦-١٨٦٨) الذى ذاق مرّ احتكاك التجار الصينيين في تجارة المواد المحتاجة لصناعة "باتيك" هو أول من قام بتوحيد التجار من أبناء البلد. نمت هذه الهيئة نموًا جيّدًا بإعانة رادين ماس تيرتو أدى سوريو Raden Mas Tirtoadisuryo وهو صحفى بجانب مدير مختبر عندما انتشرت هذه الهيئة إلى سورابايا. كان عمر سعيد تشوكرو أمينوتو Umar Said Cokroaminoto، خريج المدرسة المتوسطة الهولندية نال شهرته ضمن الهيئة وصار بعد ذلك رئيسها.

تحت رئاسة تشوكرو أمينوتو نمت هذه الهيئة وحصلت على ازدهارها. لا يكون هذا الازدهار الا ببراعة تشوكرو أمينوتو وهيئته في تحريك الناس ودعوة العلماء والمختبرين إليها. أضف إلى ذلك، ان حال الإندونيسيين الذين احتاجوا إلى هيئة تضم حاجاتهم في مواجهة هولندا وتنافس التجار الصينيين قد ساهم في الازدهار. بجانب ذلك فإن أعضاء الهيئة متنوعة منهم المسلمون الطائعون ومنهم المسلمون حسب الاسم والرؤساء والفلاحون ثم العلماء والتجار والصحفيون. كان رؤساء الهيئة عند ازدهارها لا يعادون هولندا ولكن الرؤساء بعدهم أظهروا العداوة لقرارات الحكومة الهولندية.

هناك عوامل سقوط الهيئة منها إن رؤساءها أظهروا العداوة على المستعمر الهولندي. هذا الحال ظاهر في خروج أغوس سليم وتشوكرو أمينوتو من مجلس الثورى لأنهما اعتبرا بأن المجلس ليس الا كمسرح الفكاهة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، ان أعضاءها فى الدائرات متفرضون فى عداوة الحكومة ثم حالة الاقتصاد التى تربح التجار الصينيين. فردًا لهذه العداوة قامت الحكومة بتضعيف الهيئة. الصراع والتنازع بين رؤسائها قد ساهمت أيضا فى تحديد ضوئها. لعل أكبر أسباب سقوطها خروج جماعة المسلمين حسب الاسم الذين دخلوا حزب الشيوع الإندونيسى. ازدادت الحالة سوءا بخروج أعضاء هيئة محمديّة وبرساتوان إسلام Persatuan Islam بينما للمسلمين التقليديين هيئة أخرى منذ سنة ١٩٢٦. هذه العوامل سببت سقوط شاريكة إسلام بجانب ظهور الهيئات الوطنية الأخرى التى أخذت اهتمام الناس.

I. Introduction

Every civilization has its life-cycle: rise, peak and fall. This theory was elaborated by Arnold J. Toynbee in his famous book, *A Study of History*. This is in line with Ibnu Khaldun's theory elaborated long time before him. While the former based his opinion on the world civilization, the latter based on the condition of Arab kingdoms at the time and on the life-cycle of human being: birth, growth and death. This theory can also be applied to the development of Sarekat Islam. When Sarekat Islam sounded the trumpet of Islam, people fervently rallied around it. It then reached its peak when its members swollen into huge numbers and its bargaining power to the Dutch colonial authority was very strong. However, when the leaders of Sarekat Islam began to bicker and eventually to split into many sub-groups, with differing ideas on how to react against the Dutch, its decline was on the scene. This essay attempts to elaborate the development of Sarekat Islam on its emergence, peak and decline.

II. The Emergence of Sarekat Islam.²

The deteriorating political, economic and cultural conditions of Indonesians, especially Muslims, stimulated the birth of Sarekat Islam. Such a deterioration partly stemmed from the challenge that foreigners, especially the Chinese, posed to the economy, which had previously been controlled by Indonesian Muslims before the establishment of the Dutch regime. The previous Muslim control of the economy had not only promoted the economic well-being of the indigenous inhabitants, but had also stimulated such customs as *gotong royong* (mutual help in village life) and *perundingan* (counselling), as well as providing the potential for the establishment of democratic institutions. Alas, since the establishment of Dutch rule, native leaders became the puppets of the Netherlands rather than the guardians of Indonesian welfare.³ Moreover, the whole corpus of the *priyayi* class (the civil servants and the nobility) as well as the aristocracy were utilized and employed by the Dutch colonial government.⁴ Thus, the economic domination of the Chinese together with their monopoly of the raw material for *batik*--the last trade to remain in the hands of the indigenous people--challenged Haji Samanhudi (1868-1956) to establish the trading organization called Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI),⁵ a forerunner of Sarekat Islam,⁶ in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, on October 16, 1905 after his return from pilgrimage to the Holy Land.⁷ Samanhudi was a wealthy businessman who had acquired millions as a *batik* manufacturer and merchant in Lawiyan, Surakarta, as well as Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya and Banyuwangi. He established SDI in order to help Indonesian traders compete with the Chinese merchants, who were in control of a considerable part of the Indonesian economy.⁸ SDI was also directed against the Dutch, who gave the Chinese a monopoly over the importation of the chemical products needed for the manufacture of *batik*. However, it was not directed against the Arab traders, even though they were also middlemen in the trading activities, because the latter were Muslims and showed favour and sympathy towards the native people. Indeed, the Arabs were among the financial supporters of this association.⁹ Nevertheless, for several years, SDI could not function smoothly because its actions were sometimes prohibited by the government or challenged by its opponents. During this early period, its members were mostly *batik* traders.¹⁰

In 1909, after four years as the leader of SDI and while on visit to a branch of his batik manufacture in Bandung, Samanhudi met Raden Mas Tirtoadisurjo and consulted with him on various commercial matters. The latter was an aristocratic Javanese merchant and manager of a trading company called Sarekat Dagang Islamijah, which was about to be liquidated on account of its inability to resist foreign competition. Tirtoadisurjo was also editor-in-chief of the aristocratic journal *Medan Prijaji*. Inspired by him, Samanhudi decided to establish an organization that would consist of his own factories, as well as the Sarekat Dagang Islamijah, established by Tjokroadisurjo in 1909 at Batavia (Jakarta), and the Sarekat Dagang Islam founded by Shekh Ahmad Badjened at Buitenzorg (Bogor). Moreover, Tirtoadisurjo was put in charge of organizing this union and heralding its birth in the press.¹¹ Thus, although it had initially been conceived as a union of traders and merchants, this organization soon became increasingly involved in the politics of its day. Hence, in 1911, Raden Mas Tirtoadisurjo reorganized it in line with its new political orientation. This new orientation was hailed by the indigenous population and, membership to the organization began to flourish. Moreover, Samanhudi was supported by his best friend, Raden Gunawan, who propagated the movement in West Java. Consequently, by 1912, it had attracted 360,000 members who actively participated in boycotting and fighting the Chinese monopoly. It also became the first large Indonesian nationalist party,¹² thus raising the alarm of the local Dutch official who attempted to limit the scope of the movement.

Fortunately, the movement was at a momentum and managed to gain a foothold in Surabaya as well. Consequently, in May 1912, three members went to that city and met with Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, an employee of a commercial firm there. The latter was an alumni of the Civil Service School (OSVIA), who shared in the people's dislike of government services. In addition, he was associated with a travelling wayang show (Javanese puppet performance) and was noted for his courage, fearlessness, and outspokenness in flaunting authority. That is probably why Samanhudi asked him to become a candidate for the position of the association's leader.¹³ As such, Tjokroaminoto visited Surakarta in May 13, 1912, where he was warmly received. And, in the days following his arrival, Tjokroaminoto further consolidated his position and assumed more responsibilities towards the organization. His first task was to obtain an official recognition of the movement; a task that was realized on

10th September 1912 when the organization became officially known as Sarekat Islam (SI), in order to widen the scope of its activities and membership. Moreover, with the help of Tjokrosudarmo and a Dutch notary, Mr. Dommering, Tjokroaminoto drew up new statutes for the organization on September 14, 1912, and submitted them to the resident of Surabaya.¹⁴ At the time, the SI agenda covered such topics as commerce, Muslim brotherhood, progress and religion. As a result, Sarekat Islam soon became a symbol of religious unity in the face of all the forces that were threatening Indonesian Islam, namely, the Dutch colonial government, the Chinese traders, and the priyayi who were alienated from the people they were supposed to represent.¹⁵

Not surprisingly, two SI's came into existence in Bandung by the end of 1912. The first was Darmo Lumekso, established in October by Samanhudi's brother, Haji Amir, the membership of which was largely confined to native, presumably Javanese, Muslim traders engaged in the batik trade. While, the second Bandung SI branch was established on December 25, 1912, just after the IP inaugural rally, led by Tjokroaminoto and Hasan Ali Surati. Its leadership was in the hands of such journalists as R.M. Suwardi Surjaningrat, an editor of *De Expres*, who acted as its chairman; A. Wignjadisastra, the editor-publisher of *Kaoem Moeda* (Young Generation), who was its secretary; and Abdul Muis, a proof-reader of *AID Preanger Bode*, who became the branch's vice-chairman. Of these two SI's, the more important was the Bandung SI branch led by Suwardi, a rising leader of the Indische Partij (IP), who was later to form the tripartite IP leadership together with Tjipto and Douwes Dekker.¹⁶

In its First Congress on January 26, 1913 in Surabaya, Tjokroaminoto was elected as the president of SI in East Java thanks to his efforts and charisma. His great power as orator and his ability to attract many people and to make them favourably inclined towards SI, were also taken into consideration.¹⁷ Indeed, Tjokroaminoto's appointment was not only due to his position as the editor-in-chief of *Oetoesan Hindia* (The Indian Messenger), but also to his mesmerizing oratory at the SI rallies. He is said to have had a "deep penetrating baritone voice," capable of reaching thousands of people without the use of a microphone.¹⁸ Thus, under his leadership, the organization became increasingly stronger and more popular, and began to focus more on political matters. Tjokroaminoto also re-organized and expanded the internal structure of the organization to include such new offices as the one charged with the recruitment of

new leadership cadres. He is further accredited with the creation of the constitution of SI. Consequently, the popularity of SI increased, in spite of attempts by the colonial government to limit its influence.

Hence, in January 1913, an SI branch was established in Yogyakarta, where Pakualaman administrative and religious officials occupied the majority of leadership positions. For example, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah and a religious official of the sultan, soon took over the Yogyakarta SI leadership. Dahlan became the branch's chairman and Mas Pengulu Haji Abdullah Sirat, Muhammadiyah's secretary, became its secretary.

Tjokroaminoto's position towards the Dutch government was loyal at first, as he stated in the 1913 SI congress of which he was vice-chairman: "We are loyal to the Government; we are satisfied under Dutch rule; it is not true that we wish to create unrest; it is not true that we want to fight--who says or thinks this is mentally deranged--we do not wish this, a thousand times no!"¹⁹ This attitude is quite understandable given the position of SI at the time, which was still very shaky, as well as the unpredictable nature of the Dutch government's policy towards the organization. This SI policy was reflected in its statutes, devised by Tjokroaminoto with help of his colleagues. These statutes stated that the purposes of SI were based on Islam and in accordance with the law of the land, good morals and public order. They are:

- a) to promote the interest of the native population in the fields of agriculture, trade and industry, health, education and instruction, for which the members would establish co-operative associations or commercial companies, and schools;
- b) to remove wrong concepts concerning Islam, and to promote a religious and pious life among the native population;
- c). to strengthen brotherly relations and mutual support amongst the members.²⁰

Tjokroaminoto was so popular that by 1914, he was regarded by many people as the 'ratu adil' (the righteous prince), although he and his colleagues such as H.A. Salim and other Reformist Muslim leaders, managed to later eliminate this belief. For example, in his keynote address at the first SI National Congress (1916), he declared that he had no 'ratu adil' intention.²¹

Furthermore, just before another SI congress, a Batavia branch was established. The leading figure in this new branch was R. Gunawan,

the editor-in-chief of *Pantjaran Warta* (The News Broadcast). Born the son of an assistant *wedana* (district chief) in Ngawi in 1880, he graduated from the OSVIA at Probolinggo, entered the Pangreh Pradja as a minor clerk in Ngawi, quit the service in 1907, worked as a coolie contractor for some time, and then joined Tirtoadisurjo's *Medan Prijaji* as an editor. The members of the Batavia SI soon reached more than twelve thousand, surpassing the Surabaya SI and becoming the second largest after the Surakarta SI.²² A measure of its popularity can be seen from the fact that its second congress in Surakarta in March 1913, was attended by more than 50,000 people. Moreover, at that congress, Suwardi Surjaningrat, an Indische Partij's leader, challenged SI's central leadership to drop the requirement of being a Muslim from SI membership demands.²³ Indeed, at the time, the organization resembled a political party, even though its statutes were social and economic in character. That is probably why the colonial government refused to grant SI recognition as an organization covering the whole of Java. Rather, on June 30, 1913, the government granted each SI branch recognition as an autonomous unit;²⁴ an act which led to the decentralization of the structure of SI and had both a positive and negative impact upon it. It helped, for example, broaden the scope of SI, by making it accessible to all Muslims, whether Traditionalists, Modernists or even nominal Muslims (*abangan*), who joined it *en masse*.²⁵ In addition, this decentralised structure fastened the development of the organization by making every branch participate in creating the programs of the movement as a whole, as well as its own agenda.

On the other hand, this decentralization caused difficulties for the central bureau of the organization in its attempt to maintain control over the branches and to ensure the implementation of the organizations' policy in them. It was feared that some remote branches would embark on actions contrary to the organization's policies. And, this is exactly what happened in Priangan and Banten, where the SI members declared open revolt against the Dutch authorities.²⁶ As a result, the government retaliated by withholding its recognition of any branch whose statutes defied its authority. Thus, many branches (56 in all) had to re-define their statutes in order to meet with the government's approval, which was finally granted in 1914. SI branches covered over three geographical areas: the first was West Java which included West Java itself, Sumatra and the islands near Sumatra; the second included Central Java together with Kalimantan; and the third encompassed East Java, Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok,

Sumbawa and the other islands in East Indonesia. In the same year, and as a result of the government's action, Sarekat Islam established a central committee called 'Central Comite Sarekat Islam' to coordinate and guide these recognized branches. The head of the 'Centraal Sarekat Islam' (CSI) was Tjokroaminoto himself, while Hadji Samanhudi became its vice-chairman. Consequently, the nearly autonomous SI branches were converted into local units working under the guidance of CSI. This took place in December 1913.²⁷

III. The Peak of Sarekat Islam

Sarekat Islam became an umbrella organization attracting not just the "santri" but the "abangan" as well.²⁸ All Muslims, whether modernists, such as the members of Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis),²⁹ or Traditionalist *ulamā*, as well as "abangan" Muslims, such as the members of the Budi Utomo, the ISDV (Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging/Indies Social Democratic Association)--whose name was changed into the Perserikatan Komunis di India (PKI: the League of Communists in the Indies), and the IP-SH (Indische Partij-Sarekat Hindia) were equally attracted to this organization.³⁰ As a result, Sarekat Islam became increasingly engaged in the political arena. This can be seen from the fact that while SI concentrated on religious affairs in its first congress, the second National Congress held in October 20-27, 1917 in Batavia, was dominated by political discussions. Moreover, these discussions reflected a socialist revolutionary tendency, that was influenced by the Communist ideas infiltrating the organization.

However, Tjokroaminoto tried to limit this Communist influence by defining socialism in terms of Islamic principles. He did so in his book, *Islam dan Socialism* (Islam and Socialism). On the debate about capitalism, Tjokroaminoto maintained that socialism was the enemy of the capitalists, but he added that "There are, however, various kinds of socialism. The kind that the SI makes use of is that which was granted by Allah, namely Islam, the only true basis."³¹ Tjokroaminoto believed that Islam was the only element that could unite the Indonesian people, and thus intended to make it the basis of all Sarekat Islam activities.³² Thus, in the second Al-Islam congress on May 19-21, 1924, for example, he gave an opening lecture on "Socialism based on Islam," which called upon Muslims to achieve social progress by obtaining worldly knowledge and religious knowledge. He affirmed that: "The progress of science should be

coupled with the progress of morality; the progress of mundane knowledge should be matched with the progress of the belief in the Hereafter (*ukhrawiyya*)...good progress is only that which is in accordance with Islam!"³³

The CSI, along with the Budi Utomo and the Insulinde, had been transformed into political parties in 1917 and were participating in the newly-founded Volkstraad as well as drawing up their own party programs.³⁴ Subsequently, SI members violently attacked the administration of the government. They demanded independence, although it was to be obtained by evolution, not by revolution.³⁵ In the same year, CSI held a congress that proved significant in the movement's history because it came in the wake of the afdeeling B affair³⁶ and the ensuing government suppression of local SI's. This affair not only frightened the loyalist Arabs and pious Muslim native traders away from SI and the diminution of Tjokroaminoto's power and source of income, but also forfeited Dutch trust in him.³⁷

At the second congress held in late September-early October 1918, Semaun and Darsono were appointed as commissioner and propagandist of the CSI, respectively.³⁸ Moreover, in this congress, the CSI revealed its new plan of action which called for political struggle against the colonial domination of Indonesia, as well as the domination of "sinful" capitalism over the country. In it, Tjokroaminoto also gave a speech on "self-government" and called for "the rule of the Indies by its own population, irrespective of race, colour of skin or religion." Similarly, Abdul Muis, as vice-chairman, delivered another speech on "Nationalism" and spoke of "love for our country and our fellow-countrymen" as primary tools in the liberation of Indonesia. Furthermore, in order to realize its political aims, SI began to participate in the new people's council (Volkstraad) created by the colonial government.³⁹ Needless to say, Tjokroaminoto and Abdul Muis, as Sarekat Islam's representatives, struggled for a better life for all Indonesians through the Volkstraad. In addition, SI attempted to cooperate with all organizations and persons who agreed with its principles.

At the 1919 Surabaya SI congress, which was held in late October and early November, Tjokroaminoto consolidated the SI structure following its involvement in many anti-government affairs such as the afdeeling B affair⁴⁰, the Toli-Toli incident,⁴¹ the rise of the Semarang and Yogyakarta SI as new centres, and the success of the "economic struggle." Hence, the congress decided to establish regional committees to supervise

local SIs more closely and to prepare for the eventual banning of the CSI. Moreover, Tjokroaminoto rejected all "isms" from socialism to nationalism and appealed for the unity of the SI. At the time, Both Semaun and Darsono were in jail, and other ISDV'ers were disregarded.

In the political field, SI demanded the establishment of regional councils, and an increase in the power and rights of the *Volksraad* (People's Council). As for the educational field, it demanded the abolition of the discriminatory measures employed in selecting children to schools. It also demanded compulsory education for those under 15 years old, the improvement of educational institutions at all levels, an increase in the number of schools, the promotion of the medical and the law schools into universities and the granting of scholarships to Indonesian youths for studying abroad. Correspondingly, in the field of religion, SI demanded the annulment of all laws and regulations which hampered the spread of Islam, and the payment of government salaries to *kyais* (*ulamā*) and *penghulus* (religious court). SI also became involved in the 'Indie Weerbaar Actie' (Aksi Pertahanan Hindia, Action for Indonesia's Defence) to protect Indonesia from World War I. However, after increasing frustration with a council that had no power, Tjokroaminoto withdrew from the *Volksraad* in 1921, and was followed four years later by Hadji Agus Salim, who said that the "Volkstraad is just like a comedy theatre."

After becoming the first big modern political organization in Indonesia, in the 1920's, Sarekat Islam gradually lost its attraction because of its political radicalism and advocacy of ideas that were considered too modern.⁴² This loss was also aided by the establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama, which attracted the conservative elements of society. Hence, SI started meeting with difficulties, particularly since its participation in the local and national levels of polity met with little success and it was not able to achieve justice for the peasants and the downtrodden members of society. At the same time, and with the end of the First World War and the threat of social revolution in Europe, the colonial government began to use a heavy hand with all nationalist movements. Accordingly, many Sarekat Islam leaders began to turn to religion as a basis for the organization in an effort to avoid trouble with the Dutch authorities. Tjokroaminoto, as the most prominent SI leader, supported this tendency and was aided in this by other prominent leaders such as Haji Agus Salim and Haji Fachroedin, the leader of Muhammadiyah, a modernist Muslim educational and social welfare organization. The latter movement was on a steady

road to success,⁴³ while SI was miserably on the decline.⁴⁴ However, thanks to such nationalist organizations as Budi Utomo and ISDV/PKI, which did not exclude themselves from SI, although they had implemented "party discipline" forbidding their members from joining other parties in 1920's,⁴⁵ the power of SI, as an umbrella organization for all Indonesian organizations remained unchanged. Up to this time, Sarekat Islam constituted the vanguard of Indonesian nationalist movement.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in the Sixth National Congress on October 6-10, 1921, the conflict between Sarekat Islam and its communist members reached its zenith.⁴⁷ This happened when Hadji Agus Salim and Abdul Muis,⁴⁸ who led the congress due to Tjokroaminoto's absence, launched a disciplinary policy against members of SI who were simultaneously involved in the Communist Party. This, unfortunately, tore the unity that Tjokroaminoto had woven into the organization and led to the withdrawal of these members.

Therefore, to counteract this split, SI tried to reorganize its structure in order to maintain its popularity and to effectively compete with the other organizations. Thus, it began attracting women and youth to it and soliciting their input and participation. This was done by Tjokroaminoto's wife who founded an association named "Wanudyo Utomo" (Noble Women) for SI women. As for the youth, SI established boy scout associations. And in the educational field, it established the 'Fond untuk SI-onderwijs' (Fund for SI education) for training labourers. Moreover, to gain the support of other Muslim organizations, SI became involved in organizing the First Al-Islam Congress at Cirebon (West Java) at the end of October 1922.

IV. The Decline of Sarekat Islam

The decline of SI could be traced to its organizational structure which was massive and decentralised. Most of SI members were uneducated peasants and workers who had been attracted to SI due to its novelty and the charisma of its leaders.⁴⁹ Moreover, the enormous success of SI in the first half of 1913 was based on the sense of native solidarity, expressed through newspapers and rallies, and heightened by SI leaders' militant, courageous, and pleasant-sounding voices. However, once people got used to these voices, the peasant members were no longer attracted to SI. And, although the young generation might have continued reading the newspapers and maintaining interest in the movement, Tjokroaminoto's

writings no longer sounded brilliant, extraordinary, or novel to them. This is because once they learned what a rally was really like, they lost interest in it, and no longer talked about it. To borrow the phrase a Semarang SI chairman had once used to describe the fate of the SI, one can say that people left the SI like "people finished [left after] watching wayang [Javanese puppet show]." ⁵⁰

SI's decline was also due to its dwindling financial resources which depended on the charitable grants of rich members and the registration funds of members. SI did not have a permanent financial source which could finance it independently and continually, such as the financial sources of business enterprises. Hence, the demand for more appearances and rallies created serious financial problems for the CSI which was financed by two sources. It received 10 percent of its income from local SIs during the initial six months of their establishment, and it accepted contributions, especially those collected at congresses and rallies. However, the common people were no longer interested in SI, and did not respond to the call for contributions. Hence, the amount of occasional contributions decreased, and the only way to keep the CSI going was seen to be the establishment of new local SIs and collecting money from them. Thus, Tjokroaminoto constantly travelled throughout Java, organizing rallies in new places and establishing new local SIs. This effort soon bore fruit when Sixty-three local SIs were established by the end of June 1914. After that however, the rate of establishing new local SIs in Java considerably slackened, and from July 1914 to June 1915 only eighteen local SIs were established. Similarly, from July 1915 to the end of 1916 only eleven were born. Nevertheless, from the middle of 1914 local SIs started to be organized in Sumatra and money started to flow into the CSI from the Sumatran SIs. Unfortunately, by that time many local SIs in Java were sleeping, if not dying, and Tjokroaminoto was in serious financial trouble. ⁵¹ Moreover, by the end of 1916 the establishment of local SIs in Sumatra also came to a halt thus stopping the last source of revenue for CSI. Indeed, at the time, SI was colossal but empty. And to make matters worse, its membership was gradually dwindling. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, its sheer size dwarfed the BU and the Insulinde combined. To frame this discussion, one must also declare that this temporary decline of SI was caused by its internal stagnation, as well as Tjokroaminoto's failure to provide innovative ideas for the movement. ⁵²

The decline of SI was hastened by the implementation of party discipline following the meeting of the CSI executives in Yogyakarta, on September 30, 1920. In this meeting, Tjokroaminoto and Semaun could not attend because the former had to be in Ciamis to attend an Afdeeling B trial as a witness, while the latter could not come and sent Darsono in his place. However, Darsono was refused admission on the grounds that, being a CSI propagandist, he was not a full member. The absence of these leaders thus gave Surjopranoto and Salim the opportunity to implement party discipline. It has been claimed that both of them had cunningly set the stage for this meeting in such a way that would ensure the adoption of their ideas, and the overthrow of SI's current agenda. Hence, in this meeting, the central committee decided to deprive Tjokroaminoto of all his powers and to shelve him as the figurehead chairman "in charge of CSI's general propaganda." Moreover, his proteges were dismissed from CSI's central committee and the CSI headquarters were moved from Surabaya to Yogyakarta. The new standing committee was organized by vice-chairman Surjopranoto, secretary Salim, and treasurer Fachroedin. At the meeting, it was also decided that the 1920 CSI congress should be held in Surabaya on October 16 and that party discipline should be forthwith introduced in SI. Introducing party discipline into the CSI was the gift they were to bring to van Limburg Stirum, a Governor General of the Dutch East Indies.⁵³

It should also be noted that, since its early development, SI funds had been misused by its leaders. In 1916, for example, Gunawan, an important SI leader in charge of the Western Netherlands Indies, was accused of mismanagement of SI funds and his activities were subsequently halted.⁵⁴ Another important SI leader, Tjokroaminoto, was also criticized for his misuse of organizational funds; Haji Muhammad Misbach, a communist and devout Muslim, accused him of misusing the funds of the TKNM (Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad/Prophet Muhammad Army) committee.⁵⁵ Darsono, of the communist SI faction, also attacked both Brotosuhardjo's and Tjokroaminoto's misuse of SI funds. The former could not declare where he had spent SI money, while the latter appropriated SI money for his personal use. For example, Tjokroaminoto unjustly spent a two-thousand-guilder CSI loan and took the car of the CSI treasurer for himself. He was also accused of embezzling SI funds and lavishing the money on his second wife.⁵⁶

Hence, this attack deepened the split between the communist and Islamic factions within the SI, and a bitter squabble ensued between Semaun and Bergsma, who had led the PKI, the Semarang SI, the VSTP (Vereeniging voor Spoor en Tramwegpersoneel/Railway and Tramway Workers' Union) and the Communist wing of the PPKB (Persatuan Perserikatan Kaum Buruh/Concentration of Trade Union) on the one hand, and Surjopranoto, Salim and Fachroedin, who controlled the CSI leadership, the Yogyakarta SI, the PFB (Personeel Fabriek Bond/Sugar Factory Workers' Union), the PPPB (Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera/ Native Pawnshop Workers' Union), and the non-Communist faction in the PPKB, on the other hand. Surjopranoto accused the PKI of trying to "break up the CSI" and proceeded to end all relations between the PFB and the Communist faction of the PPKB.⁵⁷

After the 1921 congress was over, the CSI leaders made every effort to strengthen their positions and to dislodge the Communists from the CSI. First, Muhammadiyah leaders, assisted by Salim, started to expand the Muhammadiyah outside the residency of Yogyakarta, and soon branches were opened in Surabaya, Madiun, Garut, and elsewhere. In such small places as Kepanjen, Pekalongan, and Kediri, the Muhammadiyah and local SIs organized joint rallies, in which the Muhammadiyah was portrayed as "the bulwark of the SI." Second, the PFB and PPPB, whose leadership overlapped with the CSI leadership, institutionalized the schism in the trade union movement. The occasion was an informal PPKB meeting held in June 1921 in Yogyakarta, in order to look for means for rejuvenating the PPKB. It was attended by delegates of nineteen unions. In it, the CSI faction led by Surjopranoto, Salim and Tedjomartojo, called for the resignation of the old PPKB leadership and the election of a new corps. Thus, in response, Semaun and Bergsma, the representatives of the Semarang faction, submitted their resignation in indignation. The congress then decided that the PPPB's central leadership under Abdul Muis (vice-chairman), Tjitrosubono (secretary), Tedjumar-tojo (treasurer), and Salim (commissioner) concurrently serve as the new PPKB leadership. And finally, unexpected help also came from the government in the form of Tjokroaminoto's arrest on August 30. The arrest made Tjokroaminoto an instant martyr and gave him an excellent chance to cleanse and purify himself of whatever faults he had committed. Thus, in Yogyakarta, the 'Comite Menegoehkan Keberanian Ra'jat' (Committee to Consolidate the People's Courage) was established the next day to support Tjokroaminoto

and others who sacrificed themselves for the pergerakan (*korban pergerakan*).⁵⁸

All these developments strengthened the position of the Yogyakarta CSI faction vis-a-vis the Semarang PKI faction, but not the SI as a whole. Many local leaders and members were committed neither to the CSI nor to the PKI, and were alienated by the maneuvers of the CSI leadership to dislodge the PKI from the CSI. Needless to say, they became so alienated from the movement that they sank into further inactivity.

In another attempt to consolidate its position, the CSI held a special congress in October 1921 in Surabaya, to discuss the issue of party discipline. However, even though the CSI was affiliated to 196 local SIs, only 36 sent delegates! This congress was dominated by Agus Salim and Abdul Muis who raised the question of party discipline on October 8. Meanwhile, Semaun and Tan Malaka (PKI representatives) pleaded for making an exception for the PKI with regards to party discipline, however Salim and Abdul Muis were unshakable. Thus, when the proposal was put to vote, it was overwhelmingly passed, and Semaun together with four other Communist delegates were forced to resign from the CSI.⁵⁹ This event marked the split within the CSI, but not within the SI as a whole, because this decision applied only to the CSI. To introduce party discipline in the local SIs, each local SI had to follow the same procedure.⁶⁰

Whereas SI managed to gain the upper hand in the political domain, its hegemony of the economy was fiercely challenged by the communists, who formed the Federation of Trade Unions. In addition, some SI branches that were influenced by the Communist Party left SI, and the popularity of SI began to decrease. Prior to the Sixth National Congress, SI had 50 branches, but, these were reduced to 40 in the Seventh National Congress held in 1923, even though the female members also attended for the first time. At this congress, SI's name was changed into PSI (Partai Sarekat Islam/Sarekat Islam Party),⁶¹ a change which later caused a severe row within the organization and brought tighter control of SI activities by the colonial government. The SI leaders' attempt to attract Muslim organizations by inclining towards Pan-Islamism also failed.⁶² Moreover, the rise of Nahdlatul Ulama after 1926⁶³, its disciplinary measures against Muhammadiyah in 1929,⁶⁴ and the tension with Persatuan Islam in the 1930s also contributed to the demise of SI's power. Hence, one can declare that the introduction of 'party discipline' in SI marked the dawn of the decline of its power and the birth of other more popular parties. Not

surprisingly then, SI became increasingly divided, and a bitter ideological feud ensued between the Islamic faction of SI, which had been transformed into political party, and the Communist ideology of the PKI/Red SI.⁶⁵ Thus, SI could no longer boast of being an umbrella group for all Muslim organizations. Rather, after the Muslim Traditionalists established their own organization, namely, Nahdlatul Ulama, SI became more and more associated with Modernist Islam thus neglecting the aspirations of the Traditionalists. Moreover, some Muslims preferred to join non-religious organizations such as Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI/Indonesian Nationalist Party).⁶⁶ Furthermore, SI subsequently began to implement a non-cooperation policy towards the Dutch colonial government and in 1931, it formed a new ideology called 'Program Asas' (Basic Program) and 'Program Tandhim' (Program of the Organization of work) as guidelines for the development of the party. However, it should also be noted that since 1932 SI has been entitled Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII).⁶⁷

Within the body of SI itself, splits and schisms occurred with increasing frequency and acrimony. Indeed after its Great Leader, Tjokroaminoto, passed away on December 17, 1934, the unity of SI began to disintegrate even faster. This occurred when its leaders became divided over the continuation of the non-cooperation policy. On March 7, 1935, Haji Agus Salim criticized this non-cooperation policy and described it as ineffective because its only outcome was the limitation of SI's action by the colonial government. In March 1935, Salim, as chairman of the Dewan Partai, asked the 'Ladjnah Tanfidziah' to review the 'Hidjrah' policy in order to preserve the existence of Sarekat Islam because the government, at the time, was promulgating stricter regulations with regards to the political activities of non-cooperative parties.⁶⁸ Needless to say, this speech led to further division within SI's leadership, and Hadji Agus Salim, as president of the party, rose to the defence of his ideas. He was defeated in this by the non-cooperation group, led by W. Wondoamiseno, in July 1936. Hadji Agus Salim and his supporters then formed an opposition committee called 'Barisan Penjedar' (Conscious-making Force) on November 28, 1936. However, to limit the impact of this group, the non-cooperation faction created a new policy in 1937 called the 'hidjrah-principle' (the principle of self help and non-cooperation).⁶⁹

Another split occurred when the 'Partai Islam Indonesia' (PARII), which had previously joined PSII in 1937, withdrew from SI and estab-

lished a party in 1938 with the same name but abbreviated to PII.⁷⁰ Consequently, the number of branches once again decreased from 135 in 1933, to 100 in 1938. A year later, another eight Central Javanese branches together with Kartosuwirjo were also dismissed from SI. Finally, the last split occurred in 1940, when Kartosuwirjo led an opposition group named 'Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII' (Committee for the Defence of Truth/Rightness in PSII) away from SI.⁷¹

V. Conclusion.

Sarekat Islam was established to help the native traders compete with their Chinese competitors. However, the economic focus of SI began to change and politics was embraced after 1912, with the growing influence of leaders who were not engaged in trade but in bureaucracy and journalism instead. This change of dissection can be detected from the change in its name with the abandonment of the word "dagang" (trade). The change of name from Sarekat Dagang Islam to Sarekat Islam marks this turning point in the history of the organization which became increasingly concerned with political matters. This is due to the fact that the economic condition could not be separated from the political condition. The former was also a result of the latter.

Sarekat Islam broadened its activities and membership, at the time, so that by 1916 it had become an umbrella organization whose members included not only the Traditionalist and Modernist Muslims but also the nominal Muslims (*abangan*) as well. Similarly, Sarekat Islam leaders started paying less interest to ideology and Islamic beliefs. They were more concerned with mobilizing the native people against the foreign rulers. Not surprisingly, this new orientation marked the peak of Sarekat Islam's career. Thus, SI soon became the first mass organization to proclaim and implement a national policy. Indeed, its congresses appeared more collective and national in nature than other "nationalist" movements.⁷¹ Because Islam acted as a symbol of national unity and was beyond the boundary of ethnic and cultural differences, and because of *Pax Neerlandica*, a policy which had unified the country through colonial authority and administrative networks, Sarekat Islam succeeded, as an organization, in covering a large area of Indonesia and was hence supported by huge numbers of Indonesians. What is more, Tjokroaminoto,

thanks to his Javanese character, contributed to the broad-based nature of Sarekat Islam at the time.

However, since the Dutch tightly controlled the nationalist movements including Sarekat Islam, and after the leadership of Sarekat Islam moved to Agus Salim and Abdul Muis, who came from Sumatra, the broad-based nature of SI was no longer to be seen. This shift in leadership signalled a renewed interest in ideological matters during the 1920's. Indeed, SI's ideology began to be more and more shaped by Islamic tenets. This change also resulted in the elimination of the Communist faction from SI. Likewise, the debate on how SI should maintain its relationship with the Dutch colonial government brought an end to its unity. This was followed in 1927 by the expulsion of Muhammadiyah from SI because the former did not follow SI's non-cooperative policy towards the Dutch. Not surprisingly, this debate tore the core leadership of SI apart. At the time, Agus Salim was expelled from SI due to his desire to change the non-cooperative policy to a more cooperative one. The power of SI was weakened after a debate on religious matters ensued between the Traditionalist and Modernist Muslims in which the former considered SI sympathetic to the latter. Thus, the Traditionalist Muslims established their own organization, which became another competitor to SI.⁷³ After SI became more and more inclined to the "santri" character, the "*abangan*" Muslims preferred to join the "secular" nationalist movements, such as Partai National Indonesia headed by Sukarno who during his youth, had been influenced by Tjokroaminoto's ideas and behaviour.

As a result, the role of SI began to decline rapidly and during the Japanese occupation, no political party was allowed to exist, including PSII, although Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, as ex-president of PSII, offered to collaborate with the Japanese. The latter, however, preferred to approach the Indonesian Ulama directly. Then, following Indonesia's independence, PSII attempted to consolidate its power after this long vacuum by joining the new Muslim political federation, Masyumi, along with other Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and Persatuan Islam. However, since the power of Syarekat Islam was no longer as highly respected by other organizations as before, this organization withdrew from this federation in 1947 and constructed an independent party. It was recognized as a minor party. This can be observed from the results of the national election in 1955 in which PSII received only 3 percent of the vote, far below the vote gained by Nahdlatul Ulama and

Masyumi. The role Syarekat Islam played in the Old Order was also equally minor. When the New Order amalgamated the Muslim parties into a new party entitled the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP/the Unity and Development Party) in 1973, PSII had to merge with it. It continued, however, to function as a non-political organization, under the name of Sarekat Islam, in a smattering of places throughout Indonesia.

End Notes.

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² This name was changed into the Partai Sarekat Islam (Muslim Association Party) in 1921, then into the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Association Party) in 1930, and into Sarekat Islam in 1971. Sarekat is also often written Sjurekat (Syarekat) or Sjarikat (Syarikat). In this essay, I use Sarekat Islam.

³ George McTurner Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," in *Asian Nationalism and the West*, ed. William L. Holland (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1953), 58

⁴ George McTurner Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 55.

⁵ The other founders of Sarekat Dagang Islam at Solo were M. Asmodimedjo, M. Kertotaruno, M. Sumowerdojo, and M. Haji Abdul Radjak. See Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia" (Michigan: University Microfilms, 1962), 162.

⁶ Another theory mentions that Sarekat Islam was born in early 1912 out of the Rekso Rumecko (the guard), an association for mutual help against bandits. It was formed by Hadji Samanhudi and his relatives, friends, and followers, to keep a vigilant eye on the security of the neighbourhood. And, when the police asked for its statutes, the Rekso Rumecko declared itself to be the Surakarta branch of the Bogor Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) and asked its leader, Tirtoadisurjo, to make the statutes for the Surakarta SDI. Thus, the date of the statutes at November 9, 1911, is, according to this theory, too early. See, Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion, Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 41-2; See also, Robert van Neil, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1970), 91.

⁷ "Hadji Samanhudi Meninggal Dunia", in *Hikmah*, 10th anniversary number, Vol. X. no. 1-2 (January 12, 1957), 36 and 43; M.A. Gani, *Cita Dasar dan Pola Perjuangan Syarikat Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 9-12.

⁸ See, Bernard H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1943), 336.

⁹ Anton Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism," (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1959), 35.

¹⁰ Noer, "The Rise and Development," 162.

¹¹ Neil, *The Emergence*, 90; Amelz [Abdul Malek el-Zamzami] (ed.), *H.O.S. Tjok-roaminoto; Hidup dan Perjuangannya* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), 88-89.

¹² C. van Dick, "Sarekat Islam," *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, Vol. III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 400.

¹³ Noer, "The Rise and Development," 163; Neil, *The Emergence*, 92.

¹⁴ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 48-49; George McTurner Kahin, *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 194.

¹⁵ Michael Charles Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt* (Ohio: Ohio University, 1990), 114-115; Robert van Neil, "From Netherlands East Indies to Republic of Indonesia, 1900-1945," in Harry Aveling (ed.), *The Development of Indonesian Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 125.

¹⁶ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 58.

¹⁷ According to van Neil, people joined SI for different reasons such as SI's renown for defying religious. Many people found it wisest to take no risk at being left out of the future good. Others, however, may have been intrigued by the secret oath and practices accompanying membership; joining SI seemed the socially acceptable thing to do and it was wisest to follow the prevailing trend. See Neil, *The Emergence*, 115.

¹⁸ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 53.

¹⁹ Neil, *The Emergence*, 94.

²⁰ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, 105.

²¹ Neil, *The Emergence*, 127.

²² *Ibid.*, 56-57.

²³ *Ibid.*, 59.

²⁴ This recognition of SI was helped by Rinkes, the Dutch adviser for Indigenous affairs, who believed that the government could control the movement more easily, once the latter was officially established. See, Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 135-136.

²⁵ Within five years, Sarekat Islam counted 800,000 members, however, it did not have a firm hold on its adherents since its membership fluctuated from two millions down to a few thousands in the span of twenty years. See, Bernard H.M. Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies*, (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1943), 184.

²⁶ For the development of the Banten branch which led to the revolt with the help of communist faction, see Williams, *Communism*, 112-133.

²⁷ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 72.

²⁸ The terms "santri" and "abangan" were popularized for the first time by an American anthropological expert, Clifford Geertz, who studied Indonesian Muslims. The former refers to the "pious" Muslims and those who struggle to make Islam the basis of the state ideology and social values. In contrast, the second refers to the "nominal" Muslims who refuse Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state ideology, preferring the "secular" Pancasila ideology. See, Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, (Illinois: the Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). However, this division has become irrelevant since then because the former relinquished the struggle to institute Islam as the Indonesian state ideology, preferring the implementation of Islam as the basis of the socio-economic culture of the society as well as attempting to "Islamize" the second group.

²⁹ For a study of Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

³⁰ Takashi Shiraishi, "Islam and Communism: an Illumination of the People's Movement in Java, 1912-1926," Vol. II, Doctoral Thesis (Michigan: U.M.I. Dissertation Information Service, 1986), 412; On the relationship between SI and the Communists in Banten, see Williams, *Communism*.

³¹ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam," *The Encyclopedia of Netherlands Indies*, Vol. V, Supplement, 374.

³² As had been told to the leader of Budi Utomo, Sutopo, shortly before the 1923 SI congress, see Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), 144.

³³ Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Sosialism*, 106.

³⁴ Shiraishi, "Islam and Communism," Vol. I, 411.

³⁵ Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 353-354.

³⁶ It was a bloody incident between members of the local SI in Priangan and the Dutch police in July 1919. See Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 113-114; McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 40-41; William A. Oates, "The Afdeeling B: An Indonesian Case Study," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 9, no. 1 (Mar. 1968), 107-117.

³⁷ Shiraishi, "Islam and Communism," vol. I, 414.

³⁸ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 108.

³⁹ The Volkstraad (People's Council) was opened for the first time in May 1918. Tjokroaminoto and Abdul Muis received seats therein as SI representatives. See, Neil, *The Emergence*, 141.

⁴⁰ Suminto, *Politik Islam*, 75-76.

⁴¹ It was an incident which killed a Dutch controller in Central Sulawesi in June 1919 following Abdul Muis's propaganda tour for the CSI in the area. See, Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 113; McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 40.

⁴² Williams, *Communist*, xxviii-xxix.

⁴³ Benda notes that the swing of the Muslim trading class from the Sarekat Islam to Muhammadiyah was because "It (the Muhammadiyah) did not propagate attacks on others, not even on Christians, or agitate against imperialism." Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 45-46 and 56; Williams, *Communism*, 133.

⁴⁴ At the time, many SI members complained that after Muhammadiyah was excluded from SI, any gain it achieved, was a loss to SI. Later, when the Traditionalist Muslims established their own organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, in 1926, many SI members, especially in East Java, quit from it and affiliated themselves to this new organization.

⁴⁵ The implementation of this "party discipline" was influenced by the introduction of this policy in the Dutch parties in the Netherlands. See, Shiraishi, "Islam and Communism", Vol. II, 412.

⁴⁶ J.D. Legge, *Indonesia*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), 128.

⁴⁷ According to Vlekke, the tension between SI and Communist members rose due to the fact that the Indonesian Communist leaders wanted to implement the advice of Soviet Communist leaders that the Communist Party in the Indies should take a strong stand not only against Western capitalism but also Pan-Islamic movement. See, Vlekke, *The Story*, 186.

⁴⁸ Abdul Muis was born in Sungai Puar, Bukittinggi (Central Sumatra) on July 3, 1878, of a noble and religious family. After finishing the Dutch elementary school in his

home town and the three-year preparatory course of Stovia medical school in Jakarta, he joined the Department of Education as a clerk (1903-1905) through the assistance of its director, J.H. Abandanon. However, he left it because of his dislike of the working environment which was dominated by Indo-Europeans who generally looked down upon the natives. He then worked as journalist at various newspapers before joining Sarekat Islam at the request of Tjokroaminoto, who saw in him a well-trained Indonesian with a radical attitude towards the injustice and grievances suffered by the Indonesian population. See, Noer, "The Rise and Development," 172-173.

⁴⁹ Many SI members were attracted to the organization in order to use the SI membership cards as magical symbols and talismans (*jimat*). Thus, after realizing that their cards did not have any magical effect, they lost interest in SI. See Neil, "From the Netherlands East Indies," 126.

⁵⁰ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 76-77.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 225. To compete with SI, the PKI set up the Sarekat Rakyat (People's Association) which drew heavily on the rural membership of the SI. As a result, some SI branches began to be divided while others completely defected to the PKI. See, Neil, "From the Netherlands East Indies," 139.

⁵⁴ Noer, "The Rise and Development," 175-176.

⁵⁵ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 143.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 225-6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 226-7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 229-30.

⁵⁹ Aside from Semaun, the four other Communist delegates were Mohammad Kasan (Kaliwungu), Suprpto (Salatiga), Sudiro (Selo), and Sardjono (Sukabumi). For the October 1921 CSI congress, see McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 103-4; Suminto, *Politik Islam*, 59-60.

⁶⁰ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 230-31; Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia*, 155. The SI split was not due to differences on the ultimate objective of gaining independence but on the method whereby it may be achieved; for a brief explanation of party discipline against the Communist members in the local SI branch of Menes (Banten), see Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds.), *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents*, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1960), 48.

⁶¹ Taufik Abdullah et al (eds.), *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1991), 233.

⁶² In 1926, Tjokroaminoto went to Mecca to attend Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud's invitation to discuss the Caliphate issue following Mustafa Kemal Attaturk's abolishment of the position of the Caliph in Turkey. A year later, Agus Salim was sent to the second congress at Mecca. See, Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 368-9; M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia c. 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 168. During 1924-27, SI was more active in handling Islamic matters. See, Suminto, *Politik Islam*, 30 and 88-9.

⁶³ Neil, "Netherlands East Indies," 142.

⁶⁴ Muhammadiyah was expelled from SI due to their dispute concerning the 'Hidjrah' policy. The former refused the non-cooperation policy adopted by the latter. See, Abdullah et al. *Sejarah Ummat*, 235.

⁶⁵ Shiraishi, *Islam and Communism*, 412.

⁶⁶ The PNI was established by Sukarno and his Bandung Study Club in May 1928 from its forerunner, the Perserikatan National Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Association), with Sukarno as its chairman. Its aim was independence for the Indonesian archipelago, to be achieved by non-cooperative methods and massive organization. See, Ricklefs, *A History*, 174; Abdullah et al. *Sejarah Ummat*, 238.

⁶⁷ Suminto, *Politik Islam*, 62.

⁶⁸ Noer, "The Rise and Development," 233.

⁶⁹ Ricklefs, *A History*, 181.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁷¹ Later, during the Indonesian independence period, this group rebelled against the Indonesian government under the banner of DI TII (Darul Islam, Tentara Islam Indonesia/ House of Islam, Indonesian Islamic Army) in West Java. See, Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion; A Study of Indonesian Political Behaviour* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1980).

⁷² Abdullah et al., *Sejarah Ummat*, 230; Ricklefs, *A History*, 158.

⁷³ In September 1937, the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah took the initiative in creating the Majelis A'laa Indonesia (Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia, MIAI). Persatuan Islam, al-Irshad and virtually every other Islamic organization throughout Indonesia soon joined. Thus, SI was no longer seen as a central figure for Muslim organizations, but just an organization amongst numerous others. See Ricklefs, *A History*, 182.

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